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BIG DATA AND THE RIGHT TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
Michal Saliternik* 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years, the big data revolution has rapidly expanded from the private to the public sector.  Today, 
government authorities at all levels analyze mass amounts of digital data produced by citizens and use it to inform 
their policy choices in such diverse areas as healthcare, education, transportation, and urban planning.  Proponents 
of this trend assert that it not only yields better policies, but also facilitates political participation by allowing more 
people to influence governmental decisions at a low cost and with little effort.  
This Article argues, however, that the political participation that big data analysis currently enables is flawed in 
two main respects.  First, such participation is usually passive and unintentional, and does not leave room for 
public deliberation over contested issues.  Second, the apparent neutrality of big data may obscure the systematic 
exclusion of socioeconomically disempowered groups who do not produce digital data that can affect public policy.  
To explicate these problems, the Article turns to the work of political philosopher Hannah Arendt, especially to 
her conception of political action and speech and to her idea of the “right to have rights.”  It then demonstrates 
these problems in recent big data initiatives in the fields of healthcare and urban planning.   
Finally, the Article asserts that in view of its participatory deficits, big data-based policymaking in its present 
form may be incompatible with constitutional norms.  It argues that under an uncommon yet plausible 
interpretation, the First Amendment may be understood to establish the positive right of citizens to participate in 
governmental policymaking in a manner that allows them to express reasoned opinions and engage in public 
deliberation.  It also argues that the Fourteenth Amendment may be understood to establish the right to equal 
participation in policymaking of all segments of the population, including socioeconomically disadvantaged groups.  
The Article explains how exactly these alleged constitutional rights apply to big data analysis and discusses some 
measures that government authorities can take to meet their corresponding obligations without giving up the 
efficiency advantages of big data-based policymaking. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the past five years or so, the big data revolution1 has rapidly expanded 
from the private to the public sector.  Following in the footsteps of 
commercial corporations that collect and analyze digital traces left by 
customers in order to offer better services, develop new products, and 
provide targeted advertising,2 federal and state authorities have begun to 
collect and analyze digital traces left by citizens in order to improve public 
policies.3  These digital traces are extracted from various sources, including 
 
 1 The term “big data” is commonly used to describe datasets containing massive amounts of 
information, which is systematically analyzed to “detect patterns, glean insights, and predict 
answers to complex questions.”  See Kate Crawford, Think Again: Big Data, FOREIGN POL’Y: THINK 
AGAIN (May 10, 2013, 12:40 AM), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/09/ 
think_again_big_data.  The growing use of big data analysis is often described as a revolution not 
only because it is enabled by advanced technologies, but also because it represents “a shift in 
mindset about how data could be used,” which is gradually changing the face of many areas of 
human endeavor.  See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A 
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 5–6 (2013).   
 2 See, e.g., BERNARD MARR, BIG DATA IN PRACTICE: HOW 45 SUCCESSFUL COMPANIES USED BIG 
DATA ANALYTICS TO DELIVER EXTRAORDINARY RESULTS 1, 17, 69, 71 (2016) (describing 
commercial uses of big data); danah boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations 
for a Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 662, 675 (2012) 
(noting that businesses use big data for diverse purposes such as targeted advertising, product 
design, and traffic planning). 
 3 See, e.g., Ron S. Jarmin & Amy B. O’Hara, Big Data and the Transformation of Public Policy Analysis, 35 
J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 715, 715 (2016) (“Recent years have seen a growing number of uses 
of novel ‛big data’ sources to monitor, improve, and study the delivery of public services.ˮ); Neil M. 
Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 404–408 (2014) 
(discussing the use of big data by government institutions); Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: 
Big Data Across the Federal Government (Mar. 29, 2012), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/04/fact-sheet-big-data-across-
federal-government (describing federal big data projects); Tom Kalil, Big Data is a Big Deal, White 
House Archives: President Barack Obama (Mar. 29, 2012, 9:23 AM), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2012/03/29/big-data-big-deal (describing the 
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social media sites, internet searches, smartphone applications, and global 
positioning systems,4 and the insights that they generate inform policies in 
such diverse areas as healthcare,5 urban planning,6 education,7 energy 
saving,8 disaster management,9 social welfare,10 and crime control.11  
The growing reliance of government authorities on big data analysis has 
many advantages.  It offers the authorities better knowledge and 
understanding of the habits and needs of those affected by their policy 
choices, and allows them to make decisions that are based on updated, 
comprehensive information.12  Some commentators argue that big data 
thereby not only enhances policy outcomes, but also facilitates a new form of 
mass participation in public affairs, which strengthens democracy, empowers 
citizens, and enhances the legitimacy of government actions.13  According to 
 
National Big Data Research and Development Initiative).  
 4 See, e.g., Gema Bello-Orgaz et al., Social Big Data: Recent Achievements and New Challenges, 28 INFO. 
FUSION 45, 45 (2016) (listing various data sources); boyd & Crawford, supra note 2, at 663 (detailing 
potential data sources).  
 5 See infra Section III.A.  
 6 See infra Section III.B.  
 7 See, e.g., BARBARA MEANS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., USE OF EDUCATION DATA AT THE 
LOCAL LEVEL: FROM ACCOUNTABILITY TO INSTRUCTIONAL IMPROVEMENT (2010), 
www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/tech/use-of-education-data/use-of-education-data.pdf (describing 
the systematic collection and analysis of information generated by and about students as a means 
to improve educational policies). 
 8 See, e.g., KATHERINE DYKES ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., ENABLING THE SMART 
WIND POWER PLANT OF THE FUTURE THROUGH SCIENCE-BASED INNOVATION (2017), 
www.nrel.gov/docs/fy17osti/68123.pdf (describing the Department of Energy’s Atmosphere to 
Electrons (A2E) program, which explores ways to improve wind power plants activity by using 
innovative technology, including big data analysis).  
 9 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE FEDERAL BIG DATA RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIC PLAN 8 (2016) (noting that the Department of Homeland Security 
together with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the US Fire Administration are 
using big data technologies to “deliver[ ] new insights on how to improve emergency training and 
reduce losses”). 
 10 See, e.g., ERIKA M. KITZMILLER, ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE FOR SOC. POLICY, IDS CASE 
STUDY: ALLEGHENY COUNTY’S DATA WAREHOUSE: LEVERAGING DATA TO ENHANCE HUMAN 
SERVICE PROGRAMS AND POLICIES 1 (2014), www.aisp.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/ 
08/AlleghenyCounty-_CaseStudy.pdf (describing how the Department of Human Services in 
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, aggregates and analyzes data from multiple sources to improve 
its services).  
 11 See, e.g., ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, 
RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (2017) (describing how police departments 
throughout the country use big data analytics to predict and investigate criminal activity). 
 12 See, e.g., Roger Stough & Dennis McBride, Big Data and U.S. Public Policy, 31 REV. POL’Y RES. 339, 
339 (2014) (“[A]nalysis of ‘Big Data’ offers potentially to provide public sector policy makers with 
extensive new information that would inform policy at unprecedentedly detailed levels.ˮ).  
 13 See, e.g., Thomas M. Philip et al., A Framework for Learning About Big Data with Mobile Technologies for 
Democratic Participation: Possibilities, Limitations, and Unanticipated Obstacles, 18 TECH., KNOWLEDGE & 
LEARNING 103 (2013) (suggesting that basic big data literacy facilitates democratic participation).  
For a similar claim in the context of global governance, see Matthew Tenney & Renee Sieber, Data-
Driven Participation: Algorithims, Cities, Citizens, and Corporate Control, 1 URB. PLAN. 101 (2016) 
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this view, the political participation that big data makes possible improves on 
other methods of political participation—including notice and comment 
procedures, closed discussions with relevant stakeholders, public hearings, 
and open online consultations—in that it engages broader segments of the 
population in government decision-making at relatively low cost.14  
However, despite these potential advantages, political participation 
through big data suffers from two main flaws.15  First, governmental big data 
analysis usually relies on the reuse and re-adaptation of data that citizens 
originally produced for other purposes.16  In these circumstances, the 
contribution of citizens to the policymaking process is passive and indirect, 
and they do not have sufficient control over the determination of their needs 
and preferences and their translation into policy choices.  Moreover, even in 
cases where citizens produce digital data specifically for policymaking 
purposes and communicate it directly to the government authority through 
a designated platform, they hardly have an opportunity to express their views 
about the policy issues at stake, let alone engage in reasoned discussion about 
them.  Their participation in the collective decision-making process thus 
remains technical and schematic.  This type of civic participation in public 
affairs is referred to in this Article as “mild participation,” as opposed to deep, 
deliberative forms of political participation.17   
Second, participation in big data-based policymaking depends on the 
production of relevant digital data.  This means that people with lower 
income and less education—who, according to empirical studies, produce 
less digital data than others—might miss important opportunities to 
participate in public affairs.18  Moreover, since big data is commonly believed 
to be neutral, objective, and apolitical, this systematic exclusion can easily go 
unnoticed and be left unaddressed.19  Hence, governmental reliance on big 
 
(describing people’s contribution to large datasets of geographic information as a form of (imperfect) 
civic participation). 
 14 See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Upholding Democracy Amid the Challenges of New Technology: What Role for the Law 
of Global Governance?, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 56 (2018) (“The availability of big data and the fast and 
relatively cheap means to process it are prompting public and private governance bodies to regard 
the traditional bidirectional communications process as unnecessarily burdensome, if not 
superfluous.”); Jonathan Bright & Helen Margetts, Big Data and Public Policy: Can It Succeed Where E-
Participation Has Failed?, 8 POL’Y & INTERNET 218, 219 (2016) (asserting that the use of big data in 
policymaking can offer a solution to the problems of low participation and high costs associated 
with many online consultation initiatives). 
 15 Of course, big data-based policymaking suffers from many limitations, ranging from poor quality 
of data to possible infringements on privacy and other human rights.  See, e.g., infra notes 53–56 and 
accompanying text.  This Article, however, focuses on the problems directly associated with the 
impact of big data on political participation.  
 16 See infra note 30 and accompanying text.  
 17 See infra Section I.A.  
 18 See infra Section I.B. 
 19 See infra Section I.B.  
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data analysis might create an “illusion of inclusion,” while actually 
entrenching socioeconomic and political gaps.20  
One might think that although the shortcomings of participation in 
public affairs through big data analysis—namely, its mild nature and the 
exclusion of disadvantaged socioeconomic groups—are disturbing, they do 
not present such an urgent problem.  After all, many governmental decisions 
are still being made without resorting to big data, and other methods of 
political participation such as public comments on suggested regulations and 
online consultations on various policy questions remain pervasive.  However, 
this reality seems to be changing very rapidly.  Taking into account the great 
interest of U.S. government agencies in big data opportunities,21 as well as 
the global trend towards big data-based policymaking,22 it seems safe to 
assume that the big data revolution in the public sector is only beginning, 
and it is here to stay.23 
In view of this prediction, it is necessary to acknowledge and understand 
the pitfalls of political participation through big data and to examine possible 
ways to address them.  In Part I, the Article begins this exploration by 
elaborating on the sources and implications of the problems of mild 
participation in and exclusion from big data analysis.  Part II turns to the 
work of political philosopher Hannah Arendt to offer a deeper theoretical 
account of these deficiencies.  It discusses Arendt’s conceptualization of 
deliberate action and opinion as the fundamental building blocks of political 
participation, as well as her claim that every person should have the right to 
such political participation, which she defines as the “right to have rights.”24  
While Arendt developed these ideas to explain the ramifications of the state-
centered political order of the mid-twentieth century, this Article suggests 
that with some adaptations, they can also be invoked to explore the 
implications of big data-based policymaking in the globalized, datafied world 
of the twenty-first century.  
Part III demonstrates the problems of mild participation in and exclusion 
from big data analysis in two preeminent domains of the public sector’s big 
 
 20 See infra Section I.B. 
 21 This interest has been stated clearly in a series of big data studies and reports published by the 
federal government.  See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 9; Press Release, White 
House, supra note 3; Kalil, supra note 3. 
 22 See, e.g., Gang-Hoon Kim et al., Big Data Applications in the Government Sector, 57 COMM. ASS’N 
COMPUTING MACHINERY, Mar. 2014, at 78, 83–84 (describing the increasing use of big-data 
applications by the governments of technologically advanced countries).  
 23 See, e.g., PENN, SCHOEN & BERLAND ASSOCS., LLC, BIG DATA AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR: A 
SURVEY OF IT DECISION MAKERS IN FEDERAL AND STATE PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS 
(2014), www.splunk.com/pdfs/fact-sheets/sap-public-sector-big-data-report-final-2.pdf (reporting 
that eighty-two percent of information technology decision makers in the federal and state 
governments expect that the use of big data in the public sector is “the way of the future”). 
 24 See infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
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data revolution, namely, healthcare and urban planning.  It details several 
governmental big data initiatives from recent years and shows that while 
these initiatives promote policymaker consideration of citizens’ objective 
health conditions and urban experiences, they do not offer citizens the 
opportunity to present and discuss their subjective preferences and views 
about related policy issues.  It also shows that due to various technological, 
financial, and mental barriers, members of socioeconomically disadvantaged 
groups are less likely to contribute data to these projects.  This means that 
those who are in greatest need of public health and urban services may have 
the fewest opportunities to affect them.  
Part IV argues that in view of its participatory deficits, big data-based 
policymaking in its present form may be incompatible with constitutional 
norms.  It notes that even though the right of citizens to participate in public 
affairs is not explicitly embedded in any provision of the Constitution, it may 
be understood to underlie the entire Constitution.  Drawing on a late-
twentieth-century body of scholarship that points to the influence of civic-
republican ideals on the Framers of the Constitution, Part IV suggests that 
the First Amendment can be interpreted as placing upon the government a 
positive duty to provide adequate opportunities for people to engage in 
meaningful discussions over public affairs.  Hence, to the extent that the 
government relies in its decisions on the production, collection, and analysis 
of big data, it must make sure that this process is as deliberative as possible.  
One possible way to do this is to employ, and push forward the development 
of, advanced artificial intelligence technologies that allow for the mass scale 
automatic analysis of complex texts. 
Part IV further examines whether the exclusion of socioeconomically 
disadvantaged groups from governmental big data analysis could be deemed 
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, either through the 
Equal Protection Clause or through the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  It 
notes that under the prevailing disparate treatment interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause, exclusion from big data analysis is likely to survive 
judicial scrutiny.  For one thing, it is hard to associate such exclusion with a 
discriminatory intention.  For another, socioeconomically disadvantaged 
people are generally not considered a protected class.25    However, if the 
Supreme Court ever accepts that the Equal Protection Clause also prohibits 
unintentional disparate impact—as many commentators assert it should—
big data-based policies that disfavor socioeconomically disadvantaged 
populations may be deemed unconstitutional.  
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause has 
gained far less attention and has been invoked far more rarely than the Equal 
Protection Clause, mainly because nineteenth-century judicial decisions 
 
 25 See infra note 220 and accompanying text. 
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interpreted it so narrowly that it became meaningless.  In recent years, 
however, legal scholars have convincingly argued that this Clause should be 
interpreted more broadly as securing, inter alia, the right to equal and 
effective participation in political life.26    This interpretation seems to entail 
that all citizens should be able to equally contribute to governmental big data 
analysis.  Part V concludes by suggesting concrete measures that government 
authorities can take in order to meet their purported duty under either the 
Equal Protection Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause to promote 
big data inclusiveness. The Conclusion summarizes the discussion. 
I.  THE PITFALLS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION THROUGH BIG DATA 
A.  Mild Participation  
When public authorities engage in big data analysis, they can use two 
types of digital data.  The first type, which may be called “non-policy-
oriented big data,” is data that was originally created for other purposes and 
which happens also to be useful for policymaking purposes.  Such data is 
usually produced without any intention to affect public policy and with no 
reflection on its possible policy implications.  Examples of non-policy-
oriented big data include patient medical records that federal agencies collect 
from hospitals and then analyze to improve public health services,27 as well 
as driver-to-driver communications that the departments of transportation 
in several states draw from navigation applications and then use to improve 
road planning and infrastructure.28  
The second type of data that government authorities use, which may be 
called “policy-oriented big data,” is created with the knowledge and specific 
intention that it be collected and analyzed for particular policymaking 
purposes.  Examples of this type include reports about hazards, nuisances, 
and other disturbances that city residents communicate directly to their local 
authorities through various online applications.  These reports are intended 
to help the authorities solve immediate problems as well as improve urban 
systems in the longer term.29 
Most of the big data that public authorities currently use belong to the 
first, non-policy-oriented type.30  While the analysis of such data can provide 
 
 26 See infra notes 231–45 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 134, 138–41 and accompanying text.  
 28 See infra notes 156–59 and accompanying text.  
 29 See infra notes 160–64 and accompanying text.  
 30 There seems to exist no comprehensive documentation of the big data sources currently used by 
the government.  However, in view of the fact that designated governmental big data platforms are 
a relatively new phenomenon, and that most collectable digital data is currently produced under 
the auspices of commercial companies, it seems safe to assume that most of the data that the 
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decisionmakers with important insights concerning the habits and needs of 
those affected by their choices, it does not give the latter sufficient control over 
the translation of these habits and needs into policy choices.31  It allows for 
the realities and experiences of large segments of the population to be 
represented in the policymaking process, but it does not give those represented 
an opportunity to sound their voices and express their perspectives on the 
policy questions at stake.  According to Nick Couldry, such denial of voice 
and opinion undermines people’s humanity and agency, understood as the 
ability to make rational decisions and be accountable for them.32  
Moreover, participation that is based on the secondary use of non-policy-
oriented digital data does not allow for public deliberation over contested 
issues, which arguably represents the ultimate form of political participation.  
The idea of deliberative democracy suggests that in order to be legitimate, 
public decision-making must represent something more than the simple 
aggregation of individual interests or preferences;33 it must be the outcome 
of authentic deliberation among those affected, which includes a joint search 
for solutions to collective problems through the exchange of reasoned 
arguments and proposals.34  Such deliberation enhances participants’ agency 
and self-realization,35 and at the same time yields better decisions.36  It cannot 
take place, however, when the contribution of people to the collective 
decision-making process is unintentional and perhaps even unconscious.  
 
government uses is non-policy oriented.  It is noteworthy that some of the data analyzed by public 
authorities has been produced for multiple purposes, both policy- and non-policy-oriented.  
However, in order to simplify the discussion, data sources are divided here into only two types. 
 31 As Nick Couldry puts it, big data analysis “aggregat[es] action-fragments from any moment in the 
stream of a person’s recorded acts into patterns that bear little relationship to how those people 
themselves understand the sequence and meaning of their actions.”  Nick Couldry, Inaugural: A 
Necessary Disenchantment: Myth, Agency and Injustice in a Digital World, 67 SOC. REV. 880, 889 (2014).  
 32 NICK COULDRY, WHY VOICE MATTERS: CULTURE AND POLITICS AFTER NEOLIBERALISM 1, 8 
(2010); Nick Couldry & Alison Powell, Big Data from the Bottom Up, BIG DATA & SOC’Y July–Dec. 
2014, at 1, 1–2.  
 33 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1548–49 (1988) (noting 
that the deliberative approach to politics assumes that public discussion can transform and refine 
individual preferences, which should not be taken as exogenous to politics). 
 34 See, e.g., ARCHON FUNG, EMPOWERED PARTICIPATION: REINVENTING URBAN DEMOCRACY 4 
(2004) (describing deliberative decision-making as “a process of structured reasoning in which 
[people] offer proposals and arguments to one another”); Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic 
Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE 17, 21 (Alan Hamlin and 
Phillip Pettit eds., 1989) (asserting that citizens regard their democratic institutions as legitimate 
insofar as they establish an appropriate framework for public deliberation).  
 35 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 36 (1985) 
(noting that under the antifederalist approach, public deliberation is considered to provide “a kind 
of ‘happiness’ that [can] be found nowhere else”). 
 36 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 302–314 (William Rehg trans., 1996) (1992) (contending that 
democratic legitimacy stems from the combination of formal and informal public deliberation that 
enhances rational policymaking). 
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These problems are somewhat mitigated when the government uses big 
data of the second type, which people create with the clear intention of 
informing policymaking processes.  However, even in these cases, 
participation usually falls short of being sufficiently deliberative and 
empowering.  Most of the information that people transfer to government 
authorities for big data analysis purposes is technical, and sometimes it is 
generated in a semi-automatic way (for example, when people operate a 
cellular application that automatically reports certain activities).  This kind 
of data sharing does not leave room for the expression of complex views or 
for substantive discussion.  It gives people the opportunity to directly affect 
public policy, yet this influence does not amount to deep engagement in the 
democratic process.   
Hence, whether participation in public affairs through big data is 
intentional or unintentional, direct or indirect, it seems fair to describe it as 
soft, latent, or “mild” form of political participation.  The question therefore 
arises whether big data platforms, whose main feature and advantage is their 
high volume, could ever be more deliberative and empowering than they 
currently are, or the increase in quantity essentially comes at the expense of 
quality.  The answer to this question depends to a large degree on the 
availability of advanced artificial intelligence technologies that allow for 
rapid and reliable analysis of complex information on a large scale.37  Such 
technological developments, in turn, may be affected by political and legal 
incentives of the kind discussed in the following Parts of this Article.  
B.  Exclusion of Disadvantaged Groups 
Deliberative models of political participation emphasize not only that 
people should have appropriate opportunities to express their views and 
exchange reasoned arguments concerning collective affairs, but also that these 
opportunities must be equal, so that all those affected can take part in the 
process.38  This brings us to the second problem with political participation 
through big data, namely that some people in society produce far less digital 
data than others and therefore make a smaller contribution, if any, to big data-
based policymaking.  In particular, digital data is scarcer when it comes to 
people with lower income and less education, as well as elderly people.  
 
 37 See infra note 214 and accompanying text. 
 38 See, e.g., Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND 
DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 67, 70 (Seyla Benhabib ed. 
1996) (arguing that legitimate public deliberation must be governed by the principle of equality); 
Cohen, supra note 34, at 21 (holding that free deliberation among equals is the basis of democratic 
legitimacy); Jürgen Habermas, Further Reflections on the Public Sphere (Thomas Burger trans.), in 
HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 421, 449 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992) (asserting that 
deliberation requires “the inclusion of all parties that might be affected”). 
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Although these characteristics correlate to some degree with race, ethnicity, 
and gender, empirical studies suggest that the “digital divide” revolves mainly 
around level of income and education, or socioeconomic status.39  
In fact, in the context of big data-based policymaking the problem of the 
digital divide is twofold.  First, members of socioeconomically disadvantaged 
groups have less access to digital devices, technologies, and networks than 
members of more privileged groups.40  Hence, many poor, uneducated people 
do not meet the basic physical conditions necessary for generating digital 
information.  Second, even when they do have digital access,  people located 
low on the socioeconomic scale do not always have the mental resources that 
enable the creation of digital content that can be relevant for public 
policymaking.41  Digital activities such as navigating, searching online 
information, or reporting hazards through designated government applications 
require a certain sociocultural orientation as well as some technical skills, which 
less educated people may not possess.42  As others have observed, the digital 
 
 39 For example, a comprehensive survey conducted by the Pew Research Center shows that in 2018, 
eighty-five percent of U.S. adults with less than a high school education did not use the internet, 
sixteen percent of adults with only high school education did not use the internet, and only seven 
percent of adults with some college education did not use the internet.  At the same time, nineteen 
percent of adults from households earning less than $30,000 a year did not use the internet, whereas 
less than two percent of adults from households earning more than $75,000 a year did not use the 
internet.  In addition, twenty-two percent of rural adults and 8 percent of urban adults did not use 
the internet.  Finally, thirty-four percent of Americans aged sixty-five and older did not use the 
internet, compared with only two percent of eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-olds.  The survey also 
shows that the gaps between men and women as well as between Whites, Blacks and Hispanics are 
much milder, with twelve percent of women, thirteen percent of Blacks, and twelve percent of 
Hispanics not using the internet, compared to eleven percent of men and eleven percent of Whites.  
Monica Anderson et al., 11% of Americans Don’t Use the Internet.  Who Are They?, PEW RES. CTR., (Mar. 
5, 2018), www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/07/some-americans-dont-use-the-internet-
who-are-they.  According to the Pew survey, the same variables (educational attainment, household 
income, community type, and age) also correlate with ownership of mobile devices as well as with 
the usage of social media (Facebook, Instagram, Pinterest, LinkedIn, and Twitter).  See Mobile Fact 
Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile; Social Media Fact 
Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media.  
 40 See Anderson, supra note 39; Mobile Fact Sheet, supra note 39; Social Media Fact Sheet, supra note 39. 
 41 See, e.g., Christian Pieter Hoffmann et al., Content Creation on the Internet: A Social Cognitive Perspective on 
the Participation Divide, 18 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 696, 701–702 (2015) (arguing that young, highly 
educated males produce more digital content than others because of their higher self-efficacy and 
lower concern for privacy); Jen Schradie, The Trend of Class, Race, and Ethnicity in Social Media Inequality: 
Who Still Cannot Afford to Blog?, 15 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 555, 567 (2012) (emphasizing the need 
to acknowledge the class-based constraints that are unique to active production, as opposed to 
passive consumption, of digital content).  
 42 For example, Hargittai and Hinnant show that people with higher levels of education and of a more 
resource-rich background are likely to use the Web for more “capital-enhancing” activities—such 
as arranging for travel, seeking health information, researching products, and banking—whereas 
those with less education and income are more likely to use the internet for entertainment.  Eszter 
Hargittai & Amanda Hinnant, Digital Inequality: Differences in Young Adults’ Use of the Internet, 35 COMM. 
RES. 602, 602 (2008).  Arguably, the activities that Hargittai and Hinnant define as “capital-
enhancing” are more likely to be used for big data analysis than the activities they classify as 
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divide in the Web 2.0 era is based not only on simplistic notions of access, but 
also on the ability to use technology in meaningful ways.43 
Some scholars contend that the digital divide is diminishing as cellular and 
internet services become more affordable and younger people who were born 
into the digital era replace older generations.44  A few of them invoke the 
“diffusion of innovations” theory to claim that information and 
communication technologies are likely to reach near-universal use that crosses 
all sectors of society, as did the television and (fixed) telephone in their time.45  
However, the twofold nature of the digital divide suggests that the rumors of 
its death may be premature.  Unlike the television or telephone, 
contemporary digital technologies are emerging and changing rapidly, 
thereby maintaining a persistent gap between those who have the skills and 
resources that facilitate adaptation and those who do not.46  It seems, then, 
that unless the underlying causes of the digital divide are effectively addressed, 
it will continue to exist and bear implications for those who are left behind. 
One might further argue that even if big data-based policymaking may 
exclude disadvantaged groups who do not produce relevant digital data, it is 
still more inclusive of such groups than other policymaking methods, and 
 
entertaining, which means that according to their findings, educated and wealthy people have 
better chances to be represented in such analysis.  See also Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in 
Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943, 964–967 (2006) (arguing that the main 
barriers to citizens’ participation in administrative decision-making are cognitive and motivational).  
 43 Michael Crutcher & Matthew Zook, Placemarks and Waterlines: Racialized Cyberscapes in Post-Katrina 
Google Earth, 40 GEOFORUM 523, 533 (2009); see also Paul Dimaggio et al., Digital Inequality: From 
Unequal Access to Differentiated Use, in SOCIAL INEQUALITY 355 (Kathryn M. Neckerman ed., 2004) 
(emphasizing that social factors affect not only formal access to the internet but also the ability of 
people to use such access in a meaningful and effective way).  
 44 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, at 17 (2007) (noting that “in both the domestic and 
the international context, that problem [the digital divide] seems likely to diminish over time, as new 
technologies, above all the Internet, are made increasingly available to people regardless of their 
income or wealth”); Andrew Power, Governance, Social Media, and the Cybercitizen—Always in Motion Is the 
Future, 10 SCRIPTED 231, 238 (2013) (asserting that the digital divide based on age is diminishing).  
 45 According to the diffusion of innovations theory, the process of the social adoption of technological 
innovations often begins with a small, privileged group of “innovators” and “early adopters,” and 
then moves on to “early majority,” “later majority,” and “laggards.”  See EVERETT M. ROGERS, 
DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 282–85 (5th ed. 2003).  Applied to the context of ICTs, this theory 
leads techno-optimists to believe that, given that access to computing and communication 
technologies is “growing with a record speed,” the digital divide is a temporary phenomenon.  See 
ILKKA TUOMI, DIGITAL DIVIDES IN THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 1 (2003).  
 46 See Crutcher & Zook, supra note 43, at  533 (contending that the digital divide should be seen as “a 
dynamic and constantly shifting gap in the use of digital resources caused by structural issues that 
can not be successfully bridged by technology alone”); Sabina Lissitsa & Azi Lev-On, Gaps Close, 
Gaps Open: A Repeated Cross-Sectional Study of the Scope and Determinants of the Ethnic Digital Divide, 7 INT’L 
J. ELECTRONIC GOVERNANCE 56, 56 (2014) (showing that even when access differences between 
groups diminish, a “ ‘second-level’ digital divide of social media usage” may persist); Jan A.G.M. 
van Dijk,  Digital Divide Research, Achievements and Shortcomings, 34 POETICS 221, 221 (2006) (asserting 
that while in terms of physical access the digital divide seems to be closing, in terms of digital skills 
and the use of applications, the divide persists or is widening). 
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that it should therefore be celebrated rather than criticized by those 
concerned about participation in politics.  Admittedly, when policymakers 
make decisions on the basis of their own intuition or judgment, yield to the 
pressures of strong interest groups, or follow some other decision-making 
logic that is insulated from public scrutiny,47 they are more likely to disregard 
the interests of disempowered groups than when they rely on big data 
analysis.48  Moreover, even when policymaking involves “traditional” 
participation mechanisms such as notice and comments, public hearings, or 
online consultations, it is likely to be less inclusive than big data-based 
policymaking, which allows many more people to contribute to the decision-
making process.  
The problem, however, is that big data can easily create an “illusion of 
inclusion” that makes the exclusion of disempowered groups go unnoticed.49   
As some scholars have noted, many people believe that big data is inclusive 
and neutral and that it offers “objective and universal insights into patterns 
of human behavior.”50  Of course, decisionmakers who rely on big data may 
have an interest to cultivate this perception of big data,51 as it helps them 
 
 47 See, e.g., Coglianese, supra note 42, at 945 (noting that “[p]rior to the advent of modern information 
technology, unelected regulatory officials made significant policy decisions through a process largely 
insulated from the general public”); Daniel Esty & Reece Rushing, The Promise of Data-Driven 
Policymaking, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Summer 2007, at 67, 69 (noting that “[i]n the absence of good 
data, policymaking frequently relies on intuition, past experience, or expertise,” and all are 
susceptible to cognitive and emotional biases).  
 48 See, e.g., MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL 
POWER IN AMERICA (2012) (detailing the increased responsiveness of American politicians toward 
the political concerns of affluent citizens); Larry M. Bartels, Economic Inequality and Political 
Representation, in THE UNSUSTAINABLE AMERICAN STATE 167, 167 (Lawrence Jacobs & Desmond 
King eds., 2009) (noting that wealthier and better-educated citizens are more likely to vote, have 
well-informed preferences, and have direct contact with public officials).   
 49 The problem of the “illusion of inclusion” was identified in the context of public participation in 
governmental decision-making through public hearings, written comments, etc.  It has been argued 
that such participation may pay lip service to democratic values while actually having little impact 
on decision-makers’ choices.  See, e.g., Roger Few et al., Public Participation and Climate Change 
Adaptation: Avoiding the Illusion of Inclusion, 7 CLIMATE POL’Y 46, 53 (2007) (observing “a common 
tendency for pre-existing power relations to persist in participatory fora despite the claims that they 
promote bottom-up decision-making”); Judith E. Innes & David E. Booher, Reframing Public 
Participation: Strategies for the 21st Century, 5 PLAN. THEORY & PRAC. 419, 419 (2004) (noting that the 
methods of participation in governmental decision-making prescribed by U.S. laws—in particular 
public hearings, review, and comment procedures—fail to achieve genuine participation).   
 50 Crawford, supra note 1; see also Chris Anderson, The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific 
Method Obsolete, WIRED: SCI. (June 23, 2008, 12:00 PM), www.wired.com/2008/06/pb-theory 
(“With enough data, the numbers speak for themselves.”). 
 51 See, e.g., Jen Schradie, Big Data Not Big Enough?  How the Digital Divide Leaves People Out, MEDIASHIFT 
(July 31, 2013), http://mediashift.org/2013/07/big-data-not-big-enough-how-digital-divide-
leaves-people-out/ (arguing that in the past, those who focused on elite groups did not pretend that 
they represented all of society, whereas “[u]sers of Big Data . . . imply that this information does 
include all ‘citizens’”). 
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obscure or at least depoliticize the disregard of vulnerable groups.52  
Arguably, such misconceptions make governmental reliance on big data no 
less dangerous to democratic values than other, less inclusive, decision-
making methods whose exclusionary elements can at least be more easily 
discerned and criticized.  
Another factor that may draw public attention away from the problem of 
exclusion from big data is the preoccupation of lawyers, scholars, and human 
rights activists with the risks that big data analysis poses to those who are 
included in digital databases, especially the risks of invasion of privacy,53 mass 
surveillance,54 cybercrime,55 and algorithmic discrimination.56  It seems that 
the intensive interest of big data critics in the rights of people who are caught 
in the big data net has led them to overlook the deprivation of those who are 
left behind.57  However, in view of the expansion of big data analysis to the 
public sector, which means that big data outsiders may be denied not only 
 
 52 See, e.g., Lawrence Joseph & Frank Pasquale, Interview on the Black Box Society, BALKINIZATION (Sept. 
19, 2004), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/09/interview-on-black-box-society_19.html 
(asserting that big data “is touted as a way to understand and control society without reference to 
the history (or patterns of thought) that gave rise to the data analyzed”). 
 53 See, e.g., MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 1, at 156 (asserting that “[i]n the era of big 
data, the . . . core strategies long used to ensure privacy . . . have lost much of their effectivenessˮ); 
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. AND TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
BIG DATA AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (2014), https://bigdatawg.nist.gov/ 
pdf/pcast_big_data_and_privacy_-_may_2014.pdf (noting that traditional technologies used to 
protect privacy can no longer be relied upon); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy 
and User Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 263–270 (2013) 
(suggesting regulatory measures to address privacy concerns arising from big data).  
 54 See, e.g., MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 1, at 150 (noting that everyday activities like 
the use of credit cards or cellular phones put people under constant surveillance); boyd & Crawford, 
supra note 2, at 664 (contending that big data can be seen “as a troubling manifestation of Big Brotherˮ). 
 55 See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, Bilking the Elderly, with a Corporate Assist, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2007), 
www.nytimes.com/2007/05/20/business/20tele.html (reporting that companies specializing in 
compiling big data sold personal financial information to “known lawbreakers”); Bruce Schneier, 
Stealing Fingerprints, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Sept. 29, 2015, 11:25 AM), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/read/stealing-fingerprints (discussing the possible implications of 
fingerprint theft).   
 56 See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 673 
(2016) (arguing that algorithm-based hiring decisions might discriminate against protected groups); 
Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-
Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1191–1205 (2017) (discussing the discriminatory potential of the 
use of machine-learning algorithms by administrative agencies); Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable 
Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 634 (2017) (presenting a technological toolkit to help ensure that 
automated decision-making complies with basic standards of fairness and antidiscrimination). 
 57 There are, however, some shorter pieces that discuss the problem of exclusion from Big Data.  See, 
e.g., Jonas Lerman, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55 (2013) (discussing the 
threats that Big Data poses to those who remain at its periphery); Schradie, supra note 51 
(highlighting the “Big Data Gap” and its relation to socioeconomic status); see also Charly Gordon, 
Big Data Exclusions and Disparate Impact: Investigating the Exclusionary Dynamics of the Big 
Data Phenomenon (2014) (unpublished MSc dissertation, London School of Economics and 
Political Science) (on file with author) (exploring digital exclusion in the private sector). 
 
726 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:3 
market opportunities but also the ability to influence public affairs, it is high 
time to take this problem seriously and find ways to address it.   
II.  HANNAH ARENDT’S ACCOUNT OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION  
In the opening of The Human Condition, political theorist Hannah Arendt 
offers her reflections on scientific and technological innovations and their 
relation to political life.  Writing in 1958, Arendt describes the major 
scientific achievements of her time—the launch of the space satellite Sputnik 
I, the splitting of the atom, and the fertilization of a human egg in a test 
tube—as clear manifestations of “the tremendousness of human power and 
mastery.”58 At the same time, though, Arendt identifies the dangers 
associated with these achievements.  Her main concern is that the “truths” 
of modern science “will no longer lend themselves to normal expression in 
speech and thought.”59 Since speech and thought are the features that 
distinguish human beings from other animals and define them as political 
creatures,60 their loss might turn people into no more than human animals,61 
who live “at the mercy of every gadget which is technically possible.”62  
Science and technology have developed immensely since Arendt wrote 
The Human Condition, but her observations seem to be as relevant as ever.  In 
the context of the big data revolution, these observations suggest that while 
governmental deployment of big data technology can greatly enhance 
administrative efficiency and productivity, it may also alienate people who 
do not speak big data’s “language” from the domains it governs.  This 
alienation may be reflected in mild public participation in these domains, or 
even in no participation at all.  Section II.A connects Arendt’s theory to the 
first risk, and Section II.B to the latter.    
A.  Arendt on Political Action and Deliberation  
A question that preoccupies Arendt throughout her work is, what does it 
mean to belong to a political community?  Following the Greek philosophers, 
Arendt asserts that the human capacities of action and speech are the 
 
 58 HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 1 (2d ed. 1998) (1958).  
 59 Id. at 3.  
 60 See  HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 377 (Shocken Books 2004) (1951) 
(noting that “man, since Aristotle, has been defined as a being commanding the power of speech and 
thought . . . and . . . has been thought of as the ‘political animal,’ that is one who by definition lives in 
a communityˮ); see also ARENDT, supra note 58, at 4 (noting that men as political beings “can experience 
meaningfulness only because they can talk with and make sense to each other and to themselvesˮ).   
 61 See ARENDT, supra note 58, at 3–4.   
 62 Id. at 3.  
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fundamental building blocks of the political sphere.63  Arendt defines action 
by distinguishing it from two other types of human activity, namely labor, 
which satisfies basic biological needs such as nutrition and reproduction,64 
and work, which produces artificial objects that can last longer than human 
beings themselves.65  Action, by contrast, is a superior activity of public 
interaction between people.66  Whereas labor and work take place within the 
private (or social) sphere, action can only take place within the public (or 
political) sphere. 67 
Closely related to action is speech, understood as a means of expression 
and persuasion through words.68  For Arendt, political life is about free 
discussion and debate among people, through which they define joint goals 
and strive to achieve them.69  Such public deliberation allows people to see the 
world from other people’s perspectives, and thereby to better understand it.70  
According to Arendt, this is “the political kind of insight par excellence.”71  
At the same time that action and speech constitute political life, they are 
also indispensable for the realization of our personality.72  “In acting and 
speaking,” Arendt explains, “men show who they are, reveal actively their 
unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human 
world.”73  Whereas the products of labor and work disclose what a person 
does, action and speech show who she is.74  In Arendt’s view, “one’s creations 
do not fully embody who one is.”75  Accordingly, “dignity . . . pertains to a 
 
 63 Id. at 24–26; see also id. at 198 (“[T]he political realm rises directly out of acting together, the ̒ sharing 
of words and deeds.ʼ”).  
 64 Id. at 7, 79–109.  
 65 Id. at 7, 136–75.  
 66 Id. at 7, 175–81. 
 67 Id.  
 68 Id. at 26.  With respect to the relationship between action and speech, Arendt notes that already in 
pre-Socratic thought, speech and action were considered to belong together, and that “this 
originally meant not only that most political action . . . is indeed transacted in words, but more 
fundamentally that finding the right words at the right moment, quite apart from the information 
or communication they may convey, is action.” Id. at 25–26.  
 69 See Shmuel Lederman, Agonism and Deliberation in Arendt, 21 CONSTELLATIONS 327, 327 (2014).  
 70 HANNAH ARENDT, THE PROMISE OF POLITICS 18 (Jerome Kohn ed., 2005); see also id. at 128 
(noting that the world shows itself differently to different persons and is “comprehensible only to 
the extent that many people can talk about it and exchange their opinions and perspectives with one 
another, over against one another”).  
 71 Id. at 18.  
 72 According to Arendt, personality and politics are closely interrelated.  In her view, “personality is 
anything but a private affair.”  HANNAH ARENDT, Karl Jaspers: A Laudatio (Clara & Richard Winston 
trans.), in MEN IN DARK TIMES 71, 72 (1958). 
 73 ARENDT, supra note 58, at 179 
 74 See TREVOR TCHIR, HANNAH ARENDT’S THEORY OF POLITICAL ACTION: DAIMONIC 
DISCLOSURE OF THE ‘WHO’ 127 (2017) (interpreting Arendt’s concept of political action); see also 
JULIA KRISTEVA, HANNAH ARENDT:  LIFE IS A NARRATIVE 56 (Frank Collins trans., 2001) (noting 
that Arendt’s “who”—as opposed to “that which”—is inevitably political).  
 75 TCHIR, supra note 74, at 35.  
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man insofar as he is more than everything he does or creates.”76 
Under the Arendtian distinction between who and what—between, on 
the one hand, political action and speech that realize one’s personality, and, 
on the other hand, pre-political labor and work that are constrained by 
necessity and utility—participation in big data-based policymaking appears 
to be located too close to the non-political side of the spectrum.  As noted 
above, the big data that policymakers use is typically produced by people for 
non-policy-oriented purposes within the course of mundane activities such as 
commuting, shopping, and communicating with family and friends.77  In 
other words, such data is a creation of the private sphere that is reused for 
public purposes.  This transplantation, however, does not attach to big data 
the superior virtues that Arendt attributes to real political action.  Moreover, 
even when big data is created for policymaking purposes in the first place, it 
is usually technical and does not allow for genuine expression of complex 
thoughts and opinions.78 
Thus, whether or not big data is policy-oriented, its production and 
analysis can hardly reveal the “unique personal identities” of its 
contributors,79 nor can they facilitate a meaningful public discussion that 
enables the participants to see reality from multiple perspectives and to find 
creative solutions to collective problems.80  To use Julia Kristeva’s words, big 
data does not have the “energeia that transcends deeds and [activities],” and 
which resists “any attempt at reification or objectification.”81  Quite to the 
contrary, big data reduces people’s needs, experiences, and thoughts to the 
objectively measurable digital traces that they leave.  In the world of big data, 
a person is not “more than everything he does or creates,”82 but, rather, 
precisely what he does or creates (provided that it has a digital aspect).  
Hence, governmental big data analysis seems to represent a “modern 
prejudice,” according to which “only the ‘objective work,’ separate from the 
person, belongs to the public [sphere],” while the person herself—her 
genuine thoughts, views, and feelings—remains in the shade.83  
From an Arendtian point of view, then, contemporary methods of 
contribution to governmental decision-making through big data either fail 
completely to meet the minimum standards of political participation properly 
so called, or, at best, represent a mild form of political participation that is 
 
 76 ARENDT, supra note 72, at 72.   
 77 See supra Section I.A.  
 78 See supra Section I.A. 
 79 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 80 See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.  
 81 See KRISTEVA, supra note 74, at 58.  
 82 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.  
 83 ARENDT, supra note 72, at 72.   
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far from the ideal model of such participation.  While it is true that this ideal 
model may be impractical—even Arendt herself does not seem to believe 
that a comprehensive public deliberation à la Greek polis could take place in 
modern mass societies84—it should nevertheless be understood to represent 
a goal to which contemporary democracies, including those that use big data 
for policymaking purposes, should constantly aspire.85 
B.  Arendt on Political Exclusion and the “Right to Have Rights” 
As noted above, for Arendt the value of public deliberation stems from 
the fact that it allows people to exchange different opinions that emerge from 
different positions.86  In other words, meaningful political participation 
depends on the human condition of plurality.87  However, notwithstanding 
the essential differences between people, in the public sphere everyone must 
be considered equal.88  This equality is an artifact of political organization: 
“[w]e are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the 
strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights.”89 
Not all people, however, enjoy the equal opportunities offered by the 
public sphere.  In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt discusses the situation 
of the paradigmatic outsider of her time—the stateless person.90  She notes 
that during the first half of the twentieth century, millions of people who were 
members of national minorities in their countries were expelled from their 
homelands and lost their citizenship without being able to acquire a new one.  
These people became stateless, lawless, and, consequentially, rightless.91  
According to Arendt, this reality revealed the main paradox underlying the 
idea of universal human rights: precisely when they were most needed, when 
people who had lost everything but their humanity could rely on nothing but 
 
 84 See ARENDT, supra note 58, at 43 (“Large numbers of people, crowded together, develop an almost 
irresistible inclination toward despotism, be this the  despotism of a person or of majority 
rule . . . .”).  
 85 As Monika Bokiniec explains, the ideal of democratic participation presented by Arendt “is not to be 
treated either as utopia, or as a concrete political project.”  Monika Bokiniec, Is Polis the Answer?  
Hannah Arendt on Democracy, 17 SANTALKA: FILOSOFIJA, KOMUNIKACIJA [COACTIVITY: PHIL., 
COMM.] 76, 80 (2009).  Instead, it is “an idea to direct us towards reformation or complementation 
of a system which failed to be democracy: [a] system, in which most citizens are not interested in 
participating in politics, and professional politicians are not interested in them participating . . . .”  Id. 
 86 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
 87 ARENDT, supra note 58, at 7, 175–6, 179. 
 88 Id. at 32–33.  According to Arendt, the human condition of plurality means “living as a distinct and 
unique being among equals.”  Id. at 178 (emphasis added). 
 89 ARENDT, supra note 60, at 382. 
 90 See id. at 344–69.  
 91 Id. at 363–76.   
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their “inalienable” rights as human beings, human rights proved to be an 
abstract, unimplementable ideal.92  
Arendt responds to the perplexities of human rights by introducing the 
concept of the ‘right to have rights.’  She defines this right as a right “to live 
in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions,”93 that is, 
to have “a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions 
effective.”94  For Arendt, the right to action is no less important than the right 
to be left alone, and the right to opinion is no less important than the right 
to think whatever one pleases.95  This perception of rights turns away from 
the liberal emphasis on negative individual freedom and focuses instead on 
active engagement in public life.96  The right to have rights may thus be 
understood as a right to politics.97  It is the right of every person to belong to 
a political community in which she is recognized as an equal potential 
partner to public deliberation over collective affairs.98  
Legal scholars and social scientists have often invoked Arendt’s concept 
of the right to have rights to explicate the plight of refugees and other people 
whose formal legal status is contested.99  Arguably, however, this concept can 
also shed light on the quandary of those who are formally considered equal 
citizens, yet in practice are excluded from various aspects of public life that 
are controlled by big data.  While it is true that exclusion from big data does 
not amount to losing one’s civil rights altogether and cannot be compared to 
statelessness or refugeehood, nothing in Arendt’s account of the right to have 
 
 92 Id. at 369–81.   
 93 Id. at 376.   
 94 Id.  According to Seyla Benhabib, the first “right” in the “the right to have rights” refers to a moral 
claim to membership in an organized political community, whereas the latter refers to the legal 
rights of the members of such a community. See SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: 
ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS 56–57 (2004). 
 95 ARENDT, supra note 60, at 376. 
 96 As noted by Jeffrey Isaac, “Arendt was a theorist of ‛positive’ rather than ‛negative’ liberty, one for 
whom problems of political participation and civic agency occupied center stage, and for whom the 
juridical strategies for limiting state power typically favored by liberals were not central.”  Jeffrey 
C. Isaac, A New Guarantee on Earth: Hannah Arendt on Human Dignity and the Politics of Human Rights, 90 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 61, 61 (1996). 
 97 James D. Ingram, What Is a “Right to Have Rights”?  Three Images of the Politics of Human Rights, 102 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 401, 408–413 (2008). 
 98 See ETIENNE  BALIBAR, MASSES, CLASSES, IDEAS: STUDIES ON POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 
BEFORE AND AFTER MARX 212 (James Swenson trans., 1994) (referring to the “universal right to 
political activity and recognition for every individual, in all the domains in which the problem of 
collectively organizing possession, power, and knowledge is posed”); Ingram, supra note 97 at 410 
(detailing Arendt’s emphasis on people serving as “equal partners in action and deliberation”);. 
 99 See, e.g., AYTEN GÜNDOĞDU, RIGHTLESSNESS IN AN AGE OF RIGHTS: HANNAH ARENDT AND THE 
CONTEMPORARY STRUGGLES OF MIGRANTS (2015); Chenchen Zhang, Between Postnationality and 
Postcoloniality: Human Rights and the Rights of Non-Citizens in a ‘Cosmopolitan Europe,’ in DECOLONIZING 
ENLIGHTENMENT: TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN A 
POSTCOLONIAL WORLD 243 (Nikita Dhawan ed., 2014). 
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rights suggests that it could only be applied to these radical situations.  In 
fact, Arendt herself recognizes that the problem of exclusion from public life 
exists on a scale.  Thus, for example, she observes that under the post-World 
War I international legal order, members of national minorities who were 
not expelled from their country and whose citizenship was not revoked were 
nonetheless “half stateless”: they enjoyed elementary rights such as the right 
to life and residence, yet other rights, especially their collective cultural rights, 
remained in jeopardy.100  In the same vein, it is possible to argue that while 
exclusion from big data does not necessarily entail absolute rightlessness, it 
nevertheless places significant restrictions on people’s ability to enjoy equal 
political rights. 
People who do not contribute to big data miss important opportunities to 
influence the public sphere.  Their health problems do not affect public 
health programs, their commuting patterns do not affect the planning of 
urban transportation, their energy consumption habits do not affect 
governmental energy policies, and their educational achievements do not 
affect public schools’ curricula.  While other people’s practices and 
preferences increasingly shape public policies, theirs remain untraceable and 
therefore irrelevant.  
As noted above, the main concern of big data insiders (or of those who 
speak on their behalf) is that their negative freedoms—especially their rights 
to privacy, personal security, and freedom of thought—might be violated.101  
By contrast, big data outsiders are deprived of the positive rights to action 
and speech (compromised and mild as they may be); they can do whatever 
they want, but nobody would notice, and they can say whatever they wish, 
but nobody would listen.  In this sense, the plight of big data outsiders 
resembles that of stateless persons, whose main problem is not that they are 
unable to exercise some civic rights, but rather that they are denied 
“[s]omething much more fundamental than freedom and justice,”102 that is, 
the right to politics, or the right to have rights.  As Serena Parekh notes, 
“[c]ivic rights, for Arendt, are . . . . the rights of man within a community” 
(or, for that matter, within big data), whereas the rightless (or the big data 
outsiders) “no longer belong to any community.”103 
Again, this does not mean that big data exiles and stateless persons are 
the same in all respects.  However, in terms of political participation and 
appearance in the public sphere, exclusion from big data in the twenty-first 
century may turn out to be analogous to exclusion from the legal framework 
 
 100 See ARENDT, supra note 60, at 352. 
 101 See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.  
 102 See ARENDT, supra note 60, at 376. 
 103 Serena Parekh, A Meaningful Place in the World: Hannah Arendt on the Nature of Human Rights, 3 J. HUM. 
RTS. 41, 45 (2004).  
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of the state in the twentieth century.  According to Arendt, the main problem 
of those who had lost the right to belong to an organized political community 
in the previous century was that they could not regain it because, due to the 
establishment of many new nation-states after the First World War, “there 
was no longer any ‘uncivilized’ spot on earth.”104  Arguably, the same can be 
said about big data exiles in today’s (and tomorrow’s) globalized, datafied 
world.  As big data-based decision-making is becoming popular in many 
public domains, the opportunities to influence public affairs outside big data 
are waning.105  
To complete the analogy between stateless persons and big data 
outsiders, it is worth mentioning Arendt’s discussion of the dramatic mask 
and its metaphoric role in the political sphere.106  In the ancient Greek 
theater, the dramatic mask had a double function: it hid the face of the actor, 
but in such a way that his voice could pass through and be heard.107  
According to Arendt, it is for this reason that the Latin word for mask—
persona108—is used in the legal language to denote the (artificial) legal status 
of a (natural) human being who belongs to an organized political 
community.109  The idea of a “legal personality,” Arendt explains, is that 
when people act in the public realm, the law assigns to them a formal, equal 
role of right-and-duty bearers, while also allowing each of theirs authentic 
voices to be heard.110  Put differently, the mask of the legal personality 
facilitates political participation and realization of human rights by covering 
the faces of people, that is, the attributes with which they are born such as 
 
 104 ARENDT, supra note 60, at 376.  
 105 Jonas Lerman similarly observes that “politicians and governments may come to rely on big data 
to such a degree that exclusion from data flows leads to exclusion from civic and political life—a 
barrier to full citizenship.” See Lerman, supra note 57, at 59. 
 106 For another juxtaposition of the right to have rights and the metaphor of the mask, see generally 
Leora Bilsky, Citizenship as Mask: Between the Imposter and the Refugee, 15 CONSTELLATIONS 72 (2008) 
(discussing Israeli citizenship law in light of Arendt’s theory).  
 107 See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 106 (Penguin Books reprt. 1990) (1963).  
 108 The word persona is etymologically connected to the idea of sound (sona) projecting through (per) 
the structure of the mask.  See P. David Marshall & Kim Barbour, Making Intellectual Room for Persona 
Studies: A New Consciousness and a Shifted Perspective, 1 PERSONA STUD. 1, 2 (2015) (tracing the 
etymological origins of the Latin word “persona”).  
 109 See ARENDT, supra note 107, at 106–107. 
 110 Id. at 107; cf. NORMA CLAIRE MORUZZI, SPEAKING THROUGH THE MASK: HANNAH ARENDT 
AND THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL IDENTITY 26 (2000) (contending that the metaphor of the mask is 
intended to propose that political action is always an assertion by a compromised, constructed 
identity).  In addition to the legal-political context, the idea that a metaphoric mask that covers 
one’s face can help her sound her authentic voice and participate in public life has also been 
examined in various psychological and artistic works, notably in Ingmar Bergman’s 1966 film 
Persona, which presents an encounter between an actress that has ceased to speak and a caregiver 
that represents many aspects of the actor’s personality.  See, e.g., Marshall & Barbour, supra note 
108, at 5 (noting that the persona is constructed in Bergman’s film as a way to negotiate one’s social 
role and position).  
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ethnicity or sex, so that these characteristics make no difference when they 
speak and act in the public sphere.111  The public sphere, in turn, serves as a 
“space of  appearance,”112 a public stage that confers dignity and importance 
upon the people that appear on it.113  
Stateless persons, however, cannot enjoy the advantages of the political 
mask.  Deprived of the formal legal status of citizenship, they remain entirely 
exposed, caught in the “abstract nakedness of being nothing but human.”114  
They are treated according to their physical characteristics rather than their 
actions and opinions.  
Big data, just like citizenship and perhaps even more so, could arguably 
function as an equalizing mask that hides people’s faces in a way that allows 
them to sound their authentic voice.  The digital environment could 
potentially free people from identity attributes such as gender or race, which 
are hard to conceal in the physical world.115  It can thus provide an 
emancipatory space of appearance where the political influence of people is 
determined by their actions and opinions and not by the characteristics that 
define them at birth.116  Admittedly, in many cases anonymized digital data 
can be de-anonymized,117 and even when data remains anonymized, it itself 
or the algorithms applied to it might reproduce real-world biases.118  
 
 111 See Bilsky, supra note 106, at 74; see also GEORGE KATEB, HANNAH ARENDT: POLITICS, 
CONSCIENCE, EVIL 10 (1983) (“Arendt presents the political actor as one who hides much in order 
to reveal more.  He wears a mask.  But the mask in the ancient theater hid the face yet allowed the 
actor’s true voice to come through. . . .  [I]t is the highest responsibility of the citizen to protect his 
mask so that in the artificial composure of his appearance the truth of his words may sound.”). 
 112 See ARENDT, supra note 58, at 199–207 (describing the political realm as a “space of appearance 
between acting and speaking men”).   
 113 See Margaret Canovan, Politics as Culture: Hannah Arendt and the Public Realm, in HANNAH ARENDT: 
CRITICAL ESSAYS, 179, 180 (Lewis P. Hinchman & Sandra K. Hinchman eds., 1994) (discussing 
Arendt’s conception of the public realm).  
 114 ARENDT, supra note 60, at 380.  
 115 For an illuminating discussion of the ability to disrupt racial identities in cyberspace, either through 
anonymity or through pseudonymity (cyber-passing), see generally Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2000).  See also Marcy Peek, Passing Beyond Identity on the Internet: Espionage and 
Counterespionage in the Internet Age, 28 VT. L. REV. 91, 93 (2003) (arguing that by controlling and 
managing the information that they provide online, people can construct their preferred digital 
identity and thereby counteract discriminatory online profiling).  
 116 See supra note 93 and accompanying text; see also BENHABIB, supra note 94, at 59 (“The right to have 
rights can be realized only in a political community in which we are judged not through the 
characteristics which define us at birth, but through our actions and opinions, by what we do and 
say and think.”). 
 117 Computer scientists have shown that even when personally identifiable information is removed 
from a database, it is possible to reidentify data subjects by combining apparently non-personally 
identifiable information.  See, e.g., Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-Anonymization 
of Large Sparse Datasets, PROC. 2008 IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 111; Latanya Sweeney, 
Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely, (Carnegie Mellon Univ. Data Privacy, Working 
Paper 3, 2000).  
 118 See, e.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 56, at 677–93 (describing how data mining can reflect 
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However, notwithstanding these misalignments, those who can get hold of 
the big data mask are likely to have many more opportunities to affect public 
affairs than those who have no access to this mask or no ability to use it.  Like 
their stateless twentieth century counterparts who were thrown out of the 
nation-state system, the twenty-first century’s big data outsiders may find 
themselves at the margins of an emerging global political order that is 
increasingly shaped by big data analysis.      
III.  BIG DATA-BASED POLICYMAKING IN PRACTICE  
A.  Healthcare  
Healthcare services in the United States suffer from a serious discrepancy: 
U.S. health expenditures per capita are the highest in the world,119 yet life 
expectancy in this country is lower than in most other developed countries.120 
In view of this reality, improving public health and reducing health 
expenditures is a major policy goal for the federal government.121  In order to 
promote this goal, the Department of Health and Human Services and its 
agencies have recently adopted several various big data projects intended to 
enhance the efficiency of disease prevention and treatment.122  A brief 
 
discriminatory real world practices); Beth E. Kolko, Lisa Nakamura, & Gilbert B. Rodman, Race in 
Cyberspace: An Introduction, in RACE IN CYBERSPACE 1, 4–5 (Beth E. Kolko, Lisa Nakamura, & Gilbert 
B. Rodman eds., 2000) (“[N]either the invisibility nor the mutability of online identity make it 
possible for you to escape your ‘real world’ identity completely. . . .  [A]ll of us who spend time 
online are already shaped by the ways in which race matters offline . . . .”). 
 119 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2015: OECD 
INDICATORS 164–67 (2015) (showing that health expenditures in the U.S. are the highest among 
OECD countries both per capita and in terms of their share of the GDP).   
 120 Id. at 47 (showing that life expectancy in the U.S is lower than the average of OECD countries); see 
also Ricardo Alonso-zaldivar, US Healthcare Spending Has Hit a New High—$10,345 Per Person, BUS. 
INSIDER (July 14, 2016, 11:03 AM), www.businessinsider.com/ap-new-peak-for-us-health-care-
spending-10345-per-person-2016-7 (noting that national healthcare spending is expected to 
continue to grow in the coming years); Lane Kenworthy, America’s Inefficient Health-Care System: 
Another Look, LANE KENWORTHY: CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE (July 10, 2011), 
https://lanekenworthy.net/2011/07/10/americas-inefficient-health-care-system-another-look/ 
(noting that the discrepancy between life expectancy and health expenditures has been an ongoing 
trend in the United States since 1970).   
 121 See, e.g., Varun Chandola et al., Knowledge Discovery from Massive Healthcare Claims Data, PROC. 19TH 
ACM SIGKDD INT’L CONF. 1312, 1312 (2013) (noting that healthcare spending is one of the key 
issues targeted by policymakers in the United States). 
 122 See, e.g., Ronald Margolis et al., The National Institutes of Health’s Big Data to Knowledge (BD2K) Initiative: 
Capitalizing on Biomedical Big Data, 21 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 957, 957 (2014) (describing 
the National Institutes of Health BD2K initiative, which funds big data research and development 
projects); Basel Kayyali et al.,  The Big Data Revolution in US Health Care: Accelerating Value and Innovation, 
MCKINSEY & CO. (April 2013), http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/healthcare-systems-and-
services/our-insights/the-big-data-revolution-in-us-health-care (discussing the government’s efforts 
to facilitate big data analysis in the health sector); Press Release, White House, supra note 3 (listing 
governmental big data initiatives in the health sector). 
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description of three such projects may demonstrate this trend.  
In 2013, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (the “CDC”) 
launched the Epidemic Prediction Initiative, which aims to develop new 
methods to predict the outbreak and spread of infectious diseases.123  While 
the CDC has been tracking influenza activity for many years now, its 
traditional surveillance system relies exclusively on clinical data provided by 
medical institutions, and therefore lags behind real-time flu activity.124  By 
contrast, the Epidemic Prediction Initiative supports the instantaneous 
mining of flu-related data drawn from social media and internet search 
engines.125  The combination of clinical and media data should enable the 
CDC to forecast, rather than monitor, the activity of influenza.126  In the next 
phase, similar prediction methods are planned to be applied to other 
infectious diseases such as dengue fever and Ebola.127  According to the 
CDC, the ultimate purpose of this project is to allow health officials to be 
more proactive in their prevention and mitigation strategies.128 
In 2014, the National Institutes of Health (the “NIH”) launched the Big 
Data to Knowledge (“BD2K”) Initiative, whose purpose is to promote big 
data-based biomedical research in the United States.129  BD2K focuses on 
building large-scale biomedical datasets and developing relevant analysis 
methods.  Using these resources and methods, BD2K centers across the 
country have already been involved in efforts to improve human 
understanding of, inter alia, the factors responsible for brain diseases, the 
dynamics of cardiovascular proteins, and the ways to optimize mobility in 
individuals with movement disabilities.130  
In 2015, the Obama administration announced the Precision Medicine 
Initiative.131  The goal of this initiative is to improve the ability of healthcare 
providers to customize disease prevention and treatment strategies to the 
 
 123 For an overview of the Epidemic Prediction Initiative, see the program’s website at About the Epidemic 
Prediction Initiative, EPIDEMIC PREDICTION INITIATIVE, predict.phiresearchlab.org/about (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2019).  
 124 See Overview of Influenza Surveillance in the United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(Oct. 13, 2016), www.cdc.gov/flu/pdf/weekly/overview-update.pdf (describing the current CDC 
flu surveillance system, which relies on data from state, local, and territorial medical institutions).   
 125 See Flu Activity Forecasting Website Launched, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 19, 
2016), www.cdc.gov/flu/news/flu-forecast-website-launched.htm.  
 126 See id.  
 127 See id.  
 128 See id.   
 129 See Margolis et al., supra note 122 and accompanying text (presenting the BD2K Initiative).  
 130 For an overview of these projects, see BD2K Centers, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (last reviewed Sept. 5, 
2018), https://datascience.nih.gov/bd2k/funded-programs/centers.  
 131 See Meg Tirrell & Cara Caruso, Obama Seeks $215 Million for Precision Medicine, CNBC (Jan. 30, 2015, 
6:03 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/01/30/obama-seeks-215-million-for-precision-
medicine.html (last updated Jan. 30, 2015, 10:18 AM).  
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specific characteristics of individual patients.132  As a first step toward this 
goal, the Department of Health and Human Services is working to build a 
national cohort of at least one million volunteers whose genetic, 
physiological, and behavioral data will be integrated into a massive database 
that will be made available to researchers and provide a platform for 
precision medicine analyses.133  
In terms of data sources, the three initiatives described above rely mainly 
on electronic heath records (“EHRs”) collected from hospitals, medical 
clinics, public health laboratories, and medical insurance companies, and 
containing such data as imaging, laboratory test results, genetic information, 
diagnoses, and medications.134  The initiatives also rely on social media 
exchanges and internet searches,135 as well as on data produced directly by 
patients who self-report their symptoms, pain scales, smoking habits, etc., or 
who use mobile sensors that monitor their blood pressure, heart rate, glucose 
level, etc.136 These sources are not unique to the initiatives discussed here; 
they are the building blocks of many (probably most) current and prospective 
healthcare big data projects.137 
 
 132 See PRECISION MED. INITIATIVE WORKING GRP., THE PRECISION MEDICINE INITIATIVE 
COHORT PROGRAM: BUILDING A RESEARCH FOUNDATION FOR 21ST CENTURY MEDICINE 6 
(2015), www.nih.gov/sites/default/files/research-training/initiatives/pmi/pmi-working-group-
report-20150917-2.pdf.  
 133 See id.  
 134 See, e.g., DP Hibar et al., Cortical Abnormalities in Bipolar Disorder: An MRI Analysis of 6503 Individuals 
from the ENIGMA Bipolar Disorder Working Group, 23 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 932, 933 (2017) 
(describing a research conducted by a BD2K center, which analyzed MRIs and other EHR data 
to shed light on the physiology of bipolar disorder); Flu Activity Forecasting Website Launched, supra note 
125 (mentioning the role of EHRs in the Epidemic Prediction Initiative); PRECISION MED. 
INITIATIVE WORKING GRP., supra note 132, at 21 (noting that “[a] substantial source of health 
data for the [Precision Medicine Initiative] cohort should derive from EHRs”).   
 135 See, e.g., Flu Activity Forecasting Website Launched, supra note 125 (explaining the role of social media 
and internet searches in the Epidemic Prediction Initiative).  
 136 See, e.g., Santosh Kumar et al., Center of Excellence for Mobile Sensor Data-to-knowledge (MD2K), 22 J AM. 
MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N. 1137, 1137 (2015) (describing the mission of a BD2K center that 
develops tools to streamline the collection and analysis of data generated by mobile health sensors); 
PRECISION MED. INITIATIVE WORKING GRP., supra note 132, at 21 (noting that in addition to 
EHRs, the Precision Medicine Initiative cohort “will also include self-report data and the ability to 
collect data from a number of other sources, such as sensors and mobile devices”). 
 137 See, e.g., Meredith A. Barrett et al., Big Data and Disease Prevention: From Quantified Self to Quantified 
Communities, 1 BIG DATA 168, 169 (2013) (discussing the contribution of big data drawn from EHRs 
and mobile health sensors to the prevention of chronic diseases); David W. Bates et al., Big Data in 
Health Care: Using Analytics to Identify and Manage High-Risk and High-Cost Patients, 33 HEALTH AFF. 
1123, 1123 (2014) (discussing EHRs’ big-data implications); Munmun De Choudhury et al., 
Predicting Postpartum Changes in Emotion and Behavior via Social Media, 2013 ACM ANN. CONF. ON HUM. 
FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSS. 3267, 3267 (2013) (suggesting that social media data can be used 
to identify early signs of mental illness); Tao Huang et al., Promises and Challenges of Big Data Computing 
in Health Sciences, 2 BIG DATA RES. 2, 4–5 (2015) (noting that mobile phones, social media, and data 
from hospitals are the main sources of medical big data); Christian R. Macedonia et al., Advanced 
Research and Data Methods in Women’s Health: Big Data Analytics, Adaptive Studies, and the Road Ahead, 129 
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As we can see, most big data analysis in the healthcare sector relies on 
the secondary use of non-policy-oriented data that was originally generated 
for other purposes.  Medical institutions store patients’ information in EHRs 
in order to offer them more efficient treatment over time and to prevent the 
loss of information.138  While the collection and storage of such information 
as well as its reuse by government agencies usually requires patients’ 
consent,139 this consent does not mean that the patient undertook medical 
examinations with the intention of affecting public policy or that she actually 
contemplated possible policy implications.  The same is true of spontaneous 
searches for medical information on the internet and the sharing of such 
information in social networks—people who engage in such activities do not 
usually intend that it will serve for policymaking purposes.  Finally, when it 
comes to self-monitoring and direct reporting by citizens, the data analyzed 
by health authorities is policy-oriented from the outset, yet it only includes 
technical information (reporters’ smoking and drinking habits, blood 
pressure, etc.), without any reference to related policy issues.  
Hence, whatever the source of medical big data, its deployment for 
policymaking purposes can offer data contributors no more than a mild form 
of political participation.  The collection and analysis process ensures that 
policymakers take into account or at least be aware of contributors’ 
“objective” health conditions, yet it does not give the latter an opportunity to 
present their views and insights about health policy questions.  It assigns 
weight to their physiological conditions and needs, but not to their thoughts 
and ideas, and thus makes no room for their unique personalities to appear in 
the public sphere and interact with each other.  Put differently, contemporary 
public engagement in health policymaking through big data does not seem to 
meet Ardent’s basic requirements of meaningful political participation.  
In any event, the situation of those who contribute technical information 
to medical databases appears to be better than the situation of those who 
cannot even enter the big data loop.  Although the data sources used by 
health authorities are quite diverse, many U.S. citizens are left outside them.  
To begin with, millions of Americans cannot afford the costs of visiting 
 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 249, 249 (2017) (highlighting the importance of large-scale EHR 
analyses in the field of gynecology); Sean D. Young, A “Big Data” Approach to HIV Epidemiology and 
Prevention, 70 PREVENTIVE MED. 17, 17–18 (2015) (examining ways to use social media and mobile 
technology data to address the HIV epidemic);.  
 138 See, e.g., David Blumenthal & Marilyn Tavenner, The “Meaningful Use” Regulation for Electronic Health 
Records, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 501, 503 (2010) (noting that EHRs can improve the safety, quality, 
and efficiency of care and help clinicians avoid preventable errors).  
 139 See, e.g., Peter B. Jensen et al., Mining Electronic Health Records: Towards Better Research Applications and 
Clinical Care, 13 NATURE REVS.: GENETICS 395, 402 (2012) (noting that patients’ agreement to the 
secondary use of EHR data is commonly obtained through an opt-in model as part of the standard 
treatment consent form).  
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hospitals and medical clinics, and therefore their medical data does not 
appear in EHRs.  In 2015, 9.1 percent of the U.S. population, or twenty-
nine million people, had no health insurance.140  Though undoubtedly high, 
this number nonetheless represents a significant decrease in the size of the 
uninsured population following the enactment of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act in 2010 and the consequent expansion of Medicaid 
eligibility in 2014.141   However, if the current administration’s plan to repeal 
major parts of this Act is ultimately realized, the number of uninsured 
persons is likely to rise again.142  Furthermore, even among people who do 
have health insurance, representation in EHRs is not equal.  One reason for 
that is that large, technologically advanced medical institutions located in 
economically developed areas make greater use of EHRs than smaller, 
peripheral institutions that usually serve poorer populations.143 
Arguably, those who cannot afford to see a physician and those who visit 
hospitals and clinics that do not use EHRs could still contribute to some medical 
big data projects by independently reporting their physiological and behavioral 
conditions or by using automatic mobile health applications that monitor and 
report such information directly to the relevant databases.  Yet, although this 
type of participation does not depend on one’s ability to pay for institutional 
healthcare services, it does require other resources such as time, trust, and a 
certain socio-psychological orientation.  For example, in order to participate in 
the national cohort created under the Precision Medicine Initiative, people are 
required to monitor and share their health data and to provide biospecimens 
over a period of at least ten years.144  Unfortunately, studies on civic 
engagement show that people from a disadvantaged social background are less 
likely to be committed to such a long-term voluntary project.145  
 
 
 140 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 2015: CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 1 (2016).  
 141 See NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, LONG-TERM TRENDS IN HEALTH INSURANCE 
COVERAGE: ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, 1968–2016, at 4 
(2017) (showing that the number of uninsured persons under the age of sixty-five dropped from 
48.3 million in 2010 to 28 million in 2016); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 140, at 2 
(attributing this drop to the enactment of the Affordable Care Act).   
 142 Repealing and replacing Obamacare was a central pledge of President Trump’s 2016 campaign and 
his administration has invested many efforts to achieve this goal.  While President Trump’s suggested 
reform has so far failed to achieve sufficient support in Congress, it is still too early to declare it dead.  
See, e.g., Obamacare Saved, But Just Barely, N.Y. TIMES: EDITORIALS, July 29, 2017, at A24. 
 143 See, e.g., Blumenthal & Tavenner, supra note 138, at 501 (noting that despite a broad consensus 
regarding the potential value of EHRs, they are still unavailable in many medical institutions).  
 144 See PRECISION MED. INITIATIVE WORKING GRP., supra note 132, at 21. 
 145 See, e.g., J. Foster-Bey, Do Race, Ethnicity, Citizenship and Socio-economic Status Determine Civic Engagement? 
1 (Corp. for Nat’l & Cmty. Serv., Working Paper No. 62, 2008), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ 
ED505266.pdf (finding that the propensity to volunteer and to remain civically engaged over time 
is confounded by income, education, race, ethnicity, and citizenship status).  
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Finally, some medical big data projects rely on social media and internet 
searches to analyze health-related practices and trends.  Here too, the 
conditions and needs of members of socioeconomically disadvantaged 
groups are likely to be underrepresented.  As noted above, poorer and less 
educated people do not use the internet as much as wealthier people, and 
even when they do, they may not use it to obtain or share information that 
could be relevant for public policymaking, such as medical information.146  
Hence, whether medical big data is extracted from institutional EHRs, self-
monitoring, or internet activity, members of disempowered groups are less 
likely to participate in it.  Consequently, the health needs of poorer populations 
might have a smaller impact on the determination of public health policy than 
the needs of other groups.  This conclusion is particularly troubling in view of 
the fact that poorer populations are generally less healthy and have a shorter 
life expectancy than other populations.  This is so not only because poorer 
people cannot afford adequate healthcare, but also due to other factors such 
as greater exposure to environmental hazards, more frequent workplace and 
home injuries, and higher rates of smoking and drinking,147 which increase the 
prevalence of chronic diseases and physical disabilities.148  This means that 
those who are underrepresented in medical big data are precisely the ones who 
have the greatest interest in its policy outcomes.  
One may question the relevance and legitimacy of this discussion and 
argue that even if socioeconomically disadvantaged people do not have equal 
opportunities to affect big data-based health policymaking, this is probably 
the last thing that concerns them.  A person whose medical data does not 
appear in EHRs because she does not have health insurance cares about 
receiving immediate healthcare services, not about the negligible policy 
implications of her absence from medical databases.  Moreover, it could be 
argued that focusing on the long-term policy implications of the exclusion of 
disadvantaged populations from big data might turn public attention away 
from the immediate hardships experienced by these populations.  This 
criticism, however, fails to acknowledge that an effective response to the 
hardships of underserved populations must include not only immediate 
remedies, but also long-term policy change, which cannot take place unless 
these populations participate in the shaping of relevant policies, inter alia by 
 
 146 See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.  
 147 See, e.g., Fred C. Pampel et al., Socioeconomic Disparities in Health Behaviors, 36 ANN. REV. SOC. 349, 
350 (2010) (reviewing various explanations for unhealthy behaviors among low-status 
socioeconomic groups). 
 148 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Health Disparities and Inequalities Report—United States, 
2013, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Nov. 23, 2013, at 1, 15 (observing that lower 
socioeconomic position is associated with higher morbidity and mortality and mentioning 
behavioral and environmental factors that account for this correlation). 
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producing big data.149 
B.  Urban Planning  
As the world’s population rapidly grows and urbanizes,150 adopting 
advanced, data-based solutions to the increasing pressure on urban 
infrastructure becomes an imperative.151  From China to Singapore to Abu 
Dhabi to Spain, national and local governments around the world are 
attempting to turn crowded cities into “smart cities” that use resources and 
provide services in an informed, efficient, and sustainable way.152  The 
United States is no exception.  In the last couple of years, municipal 
authorities across the country have launched numerous smart city projects,153 
often with the support of the federal government.154  These projects use big 
data analytics in order to save energy, reduce pollution, improve sanitation, 
facilitate the flow of traffic, and offer overall better services to the residents.155  
Smartphone applications are a major source of data for many of these 
projects.  For example, the departments of transportation in Alabama, 
Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, Oregon, and in several other states and 
municipalities have recently entered into agreements with the crowdsourced 
navigation application Waze, according to which Waze will share with them 
traffic and road condition reports that it collects from drivers.156  The idea, 
according to Waze, is to improve the day-to-day management as well as the 
 
 149 See, e.g., Ursula E. Bauer & Marcus Plescia, Addressing Disparities in the Health of American Indian and 
Alaska Native People: The Importance of Improved Public Health Data, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S255, 
S255–57 (2014) (noting that data gaps pose an obstacle to creating health policies that adequately 
address the particular health needs of the Native American population, such as extremely high rates 
of diabetes and chronic liver disease).  
 150 The urban population of the world has grown from 746 million in 1950 to 3.9 billion in 2014 and 
is expected to grow to 6.3 billion by 2050.  See UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, 
WORLD URBANIZATION PROSPECTS: THE 2014 REVISION 11 (2015).  The United States is among 
the most urbanized countries in the world, with about 265 million city dwellers in 2015, expected 
to grow to 350 million by 2050.  Id. at 225.  
 151 See id. at 3 (noting that “rapid and unplanned urban growth threatens sustainable development 
when the necessary infrastructure is not developed”).  
 152 Smart cities may be defined as “places where information technology is combined with 
infrastructure, architecture, everyday objects, and even our bodies to address social, economic, and 
environmental problems.”  ANTHONY M. TOWNSEND, SMART CITIES: BIG DATA, CIVIC 
HACKERS, AND THE QUEST FOR A NEW UTOPIA 15 (2014).  
 153 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
FUTURE OF CITIES 8–27 (2016) (providing an overview of ongoing and planned smart city projects 
in the United States).  
 154 See id. at 62–68 (describing major federal government smart city initiatives, including the 2013 
Department of Commerce Smart America Challenge, the 2015 Department of Transportation 
Smart City Challenge, and the 2015 White House Smart Cities Initiative).   
 155 Id. at 1–3 (summarizing the main goals of smart city projects).  
 156 See Connected Citizens Program, WAZE, https://www.waze.com/ccp (last visited Jan. 4, 2019). 
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longer-term planning of urban transportation.157  Another popular 
smartphone application from which local authorities extract big data is 
Strava Metro, which tracks users’ cycling activity and aggregates the data to 
identify common cycling routes and times.158  Municipal authorities in 
Portland, Seattle, Orlando, and other major U.S. cities use this data to 
accommodate their road and transportation design to cyclers’ needs.159  
In addition to the secondary use of non-policy-oriented applications like 
Waze and Strava Metro, many local authorities also extract data from 
designated smart city mobile applications.  A famous example is Street 
Bump, which has been developed and used by the City of Boston and is 
expected to also become available to other cities.  This application 
automatically reports to the local authorities whenever a user drives over a 
pothole,160 thereby allowing the authorities to make immediate repairs and 
at the same time to better plan road infrastructure and maintenance.161  
Another notable example is 311 applications that allow city residents to 
report various types of hazards and impediments.  Here, too, municipal 
authorities use the reports both to solve immediate problems (e.g., fix a 
sewage leak) and to improve relevant systems in the longer term (e.g., 
redesign sewage infrastructure on the basis of accumulated data).162 
Another, relatively new, source of data for smart city analytics is personal 
sensors.  Such sensors are currently being used in several cities in Europe.  
Such sensors are currently being used in several cities in Europe, including 
Amsterdam, Barcelona, and Manchester.  In these cities, some residents have 
voluntarily installed on their apartments’ windows Smart Citizen Kits that 
collect environmental data.  The kit contains a board with several sensors 
that measure air composition, light intensity, noise levels, and other 
environmental data.163   This data is constantly streamed to a common 
 
 157 See Ryan Bradley, Waze and the Traffic Panopticon, NEW YORKER (June 2, 2015), 
www.newyorker.com/business/currency/waze-and-the-traffic-panopticon (detailing how Waze 
aims to “improve some of [Los Angeles’] traffic and infrastructure systems . . . .”). 
 158 See How It Works, STRAVA METRO, https://metro.strava.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).  
 159 See, e.g., Peter Walker, City Planners Tap into Wealth of Cycling Data from Strava Tracking App, GUARDIAN 
(May 9, 2016, 3:26 PM), www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/may/09/city-planners-
cycling-data-strava-tracking-app.  
 160 See Street Bump, CITY OF BOS., http://www.boston.gov/departments/new-urban-mechanics/street-
bump (last updated Apr. 21, 2017). 
 161 See id.  
 162 See, e.g., City of Boston Apps: BOS:311, CITY OF BOS., https://www.boston.gov/departments/ 
innovation-and-technology/apps (last updated May 11, 2018); MyLA311, CITY OF L.A., 
https://myla311.lacity.org/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2019); NYC311, CITY OF N.Y.C., 
https://www1.nyc.gov/311/index.page (last visited Jan. 4, 2019).  
 163 See Smart Citizen: A Kit and Platform Which Engages Citizens in Solving Local Environmental Problems, 
DIGITAL SOC. INNOVATION (Oct. 2016), https://digitalsocial.eu/case-study/9/smart-citizen (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2018).  
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platform that can be accessed by municipal authorities.164  Currently, it 
seems, no U.S. local government is systematically extracting data from 
personal sensor kits.165  However, several academic research groups have 
received governmental funding to develop such systems.  For example, a 
group from the University of Michigan is developing the Sensors in a 
Shoebox Kit, which can measure environmental parameters such as air 
quality, humidity, and pedestrian traffic.166  The kits are planned to be 
operated by high school students in the City of Detroit, who will be able to 
learn about their neighborhoods and provide relevant data to decision-
makers.167  Another group of researchers from New York University is 
developing advanced microphones that will be able to record and identify 
various types of urban sounds, from the noise of an air conditioner to a dog’s 
barking.168  Developers hope that these microphones will eventually be used 
by New York City residents to understand noise pollution in their city and to 
assist city officials in addressing the problem.169  
Finally, some municipal authorities collect data from public sensors that 
they themselves install and operate in public places.  An example in point is 
the Array of Things project implemented by the City of Chicago.  Under this 
project, the City of Chicago plans to install on traffic light poles across the 
city five hundred sensors (nodes) that will measure weather conditions, air 
quality, and pedestrian and vehicular traffic.170  Ultimately, this data will help 
city agencies study and address critical city challenges such as improving air 
quality and traffic safety and preventing urban flooding.171  
 
 
 164 See Smart Citizen: About, SMART CITIZEN, https://smartcitizen.me/about (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).  
 165 bkmk No relevant information was displayed when the Author searched on Google the terms 
“city/urban” and “sensor” combined with the names of the fifty most populated cities in the United 
States.  The list of the most populated U.S. cities was taken from the World Population Review.  
See US City Populations, WORLD POPULATION REV., http://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/ 
(last visited Feb. 6, 2019) 
 166 See U-M School of Education, College of Engineering Partner to Win Knight Cities Challenge Award, U. 
MICHIGAN NEWS (Apr. 12, 2016), http://ns.umich.edu/new/releases/23700-u-m-school-of-
education-college-of-engineering-partner-to-win-knight-cities-challenge-award; see also Amy 
Crawford, Detroit Imagines a Citizen-Led Smart City, CITYLAB (May 31, 2017), 
https://www.citylab.com/life/2017/05/detroit-imagines-a-citizen-led-smart-city/528441/. 
 167 See Crawford, supra note 166. 
 168 See Emily S. Rueb, To Create a Quieter City, They’re Recording the Sounds of New York, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/07/nyregion/to-create-a-quieter-city-theyre-
recording-the-sounds-of-new-york.html (“A group of researchers from New York University and 
Ohio State University are training the microphones to recognize jackhammers, idling engines and 
street music, using technology originally developed to identify the flight calls of migrating birds.”). 
 169 See id.  
 170 Press Release, Computation Institute, Chicago Becomes First City to Launch Array of Things (Aug. 
29, 2016), https://ci.uchicago.edu/press-releases/chicago-becomes-first-city-launch-array-things 
(“The first two nodes . . . will collect information on weather, traffic, and air quality.”). 
 171 See id.  
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In terms of civic engagement, all of the abovementioned smart city 
initiatives seem to suffer from the dual chronic disease characteristic of big 
data-based policymaking.  First, these initiatives establish a mild form of 
political participation.  They offer city residents representation but not voice, 
consideration but not deliberation.  This is obviously true of smartphone 
applications like Waze and Strava Metro, which people use with no policy 
motivations in mind.  However, it is also true of policy-oriented applications 
such as Street Bump, which provide people with the opportunity to influence 
city affairs directly and purposefully, but only in a technical, semi-automatic 
manner.  
311-like applications are somewhat different in that they are more open-
ended and allow citizens greater control over the information and, no less 
importantly, the specific message that they transfer to the authorities.  
Theoretically speaking, city residents could use these applications to express 
their views on a variety of municipal issues and offer their personal policy 
advice.  In practice, however, it is doubtful that local authorities currently 
have the technical capacity to conduct systematic large-scale analyses of such 
complex data.  Until such capacities become operational, 311 applications 
are unlikely to provide a platform for meaningful political participation 
through big data.172  
Sure enough, personal sensors offer no better opportunities for people to 
engage in public deliberation over urban affairs.  In fact, when local 
authorities rely on personal sensors to inform policymaking, the very 
particular role they assign to people is to be device carriers, demonstrating 
anything but respect for their capacities as rational agents.  This situation 
seems to perfectly realize Arendt’s concerns about the rise of machines and 
the objectification of human beings.173  It also seems safe to assume that 
Arendt would have been uncomfortable with the widespread use of public 
sensors that are installed on street poles and which communicate information 
to policymakers, quite literally, over people’s heads, giving them no role 
whatsoever in the policymaking process.   
Second, smart city projects of the kind discussed above are likely to have 
an exclusionary effect on socioeconomically disadvantaged groups.  A 
smartphone application like Waze, Strava Metro, Street Bump, or 311 can 
only be used by people who own a smartphone and have downloaded and 
know how to operate the application.  Since people with limited financial 
resources and poor technological or civic orientation are less likely than 
others to be such,174 lower-class neighborhoods may not equally benefit from 
 
 172 See infra notes 214–18 and accompanying text.  
 173 See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.  
 174 It has been observed, for example, that leisure and sport cyclists tend to use the Strava Metro 
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the services that municipal authorities provide and from the policies that they 
adopt on the basis of data retrieved from mobile applications.  
When it comes to environmental sensors, the reasons for the 
underrepresentation of socioeconomically disadvantaged populations are 
somewhat different and are not necessarily connected with the “digital 
divide.”  Unlike big data projects that draw information from mobile phone 
applications in an apparently random bottom-up manner, projects that rely 
on environmental sensors are more likely to be controlled from above.  This 
is true for public sensors that local authorities directly install and operate, 
and it may also be true for personal sensors if the authorities allocate them to 
a selected group of residents.  In these cases, local officials might distribute 
sensors in an unequal manner, awarding higher priority to identifying the 
environmental needs of wealthier residents, which usually have greater 
influence on local politics.175  For example, in Chicago’s Array of Things 
project, the location of more than a hundred nodes have already been 
determined.  A close examination reveals that hardly any nodes are currently 
installed or planned to be installed in the city’s poorer neighborhoods.176  
This example demonstrates that when the authorities themselves control the 
production of big data, they might reproduce the exclusionary patterns that 
often characterize traditional policymaking processes. 
It has been noted above that disadvantaged populations who have a 
relatively small influence on big data-based health policymaking are usually 
the ones who have the greatest interest in public health policy.  Apparently, 
the same is true of those excluded from big data-based urban planning.177  
 
application more than people who ride their bikes to work, and that people who live in Manhattan 
are two to three times more likely to report disturbances through New York City’s 311 application 
than their poorer neighbors in Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx.  See Rueb, supra note 168; Walker, 
supra note 159.   
 175 This tendency of government agents to award higher priority to the interests of more powerful 
groups within their constituencies has been extensively discussed in public choice literature.  See, 
e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY 
OF GROUPS 34–35 (7th prtg. 1977) (explaining why small, well-organized interest groups have 
considerable influence over public decision-makers); Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among 
Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 372 (1983) (explaining why government 
agents promote policies that they believe to be favored by powerful constituencies).  
 176 See Array of Things Locations, CITY OF CHI.: DATA PORTAL, https://data.cityofchicago.org/ 
Environment-Sustainable-Development/Array-of-Things-Locations/6rq2-yx28/data (last 
updated Dec. 20, 2018) (providing a list of the locations of 111 nodes); Census Data—Selected 
Socioeconomic Indicators in Chicago, 2008–2012, CITY OF CHI.: DATA PORTAL, 
https://data.cityofchicago.org/Health-Human-Services/Census-Data-Selected-socioeconomic-
indicators-in-C/kn9c-c2s2 (last updated Sept. 12, 2014) (drawing on national census data to rank 
Chicago’s neighborhoods (community areas) according to selected socioeconomic indicators); Node 
Location Map, ARRAY OF THINGS, https://arrayofthings.github.io/node-locations.html (presenting 
the first phase’s nodes on the city map) (last visited Jan. 4, 2019). 
 177 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 153, at 8 (noting that the “[c]hallenges faced 
by Americans living in cities . . . . are often intensified for those who are poor, disabled, young, 
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Poorer people who live in poorer neighborhoods usually suffer more from 
noise, air pollution, and other annoyances, and are more dependent on 
publicly funded services to address these impediments.178  However, if the 
provision of public services is determined to a large extent by big data 
analysis, these people are the least likely to enjoy them, in both the short and 
the longer term.  
IV.  IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO MEANINGFUL AND 
INCLUSIVE PARTICIPATION?  
The upshot of the previous Parts is that there is a significant gap between 
the alleged participatory potential of big data-based policymaking and its 
actual impact on public engagement in political decision-making.  On the 
one hand, big data technologies allow government officials to take into 
account much more information about many more people than they ever 
could before, and thus to adopt directives, regulations, and general policies 
that are more responsive to the needs and interests of greater segments of the 
population.  On the other hand, big data can only represent people’s needs 
in a superficial and schematic manner, and it cannot offer them real voice or 
meaningful deliberation.  In addition, big data’s inclusiveness seems to end 
at the doorstep of socioeconomically disadvantaged populations who do not 
produce relevant digital data.  
This Part sets out to examine whether constitutional law can have a role 
in reducing the gap between the promise and reality of political participation 
through big data.  Section IV.A suggests that the First Amendment may be 
understood to place upon public authorities that rely on big data analysis a 
duty to ensure that it does not deny people the opportunity to express and 
discuss their views in a meaningful way.  Section IV.B suggests that the 
Fourteenth Amendment may be understood to place upon the same 
authorities a duty to ensure that all those potentially affected by their 
decisions, including members of socioeconomically disadvantaged groups, 
have an equal opportunity to participate.  Both sections discuss concrete 
measures that the government can take to dispose of these purported 
constitutional duties.  
 
alone, or aged” and that “[t]hese same disadvantaged groups also often have the least opportunity 
to take direct advantage of new technologies”).  
 178 See, e.g., Edmund Yet Wah Seto et al., Spatial Distribution of Traffic Induced Noise Exposures in a US City: 
An Analytic Tool for Assessing the Health Impacts of Urban Planning Decisions, 6 INT’L J. HEALTH 
GEOGRAPHICS 24 (2007) (finding that in San Francisco, the risk of annoyance from urban noise 
varies considerably between neighborhoods). 
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A.  Mild Participation and the First Amendment 
The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly mention the right of citizens to 
participate in political or public affairs.  In fact, even the narrower right to 
vote in periodic elections, which is a core component of the right to political 
participation,179 is only indirectly embedded in the Constitution.180  It could 
be argued, however, that in view of its centrality to the Founding Fathers’ 
legal and political vision, the right to political participation should 
nonetheless be understood to underlie American constitutional law and 
should inspire the interpretation of various constitutional norms.181  
But how exactly did the Constitution’s Framers conceive of the right to 
political participation?  What was the content and scope of this right in their 
vision?  For the Framers, the main purpose of political participation was to 
ensure that the government promotes the common good of the citizenry and 
refrains from using its power in an abusive or arbitrary manner.182  This goal 
apparently implied a rather narrow conception of political participation, 
which focused on the right to vote.  As James Madison explains in The 
Federalist No. 39,  
It is essential to [the] government that [its power] be derived from the great 
body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class 
of it . . . .  It is sufficient for such a government that the persons administering 
it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people . . . .”183 
According to Madison, the participation of a large body of voters in elections 
provides both a necessary and sufficient guarantee that the citizens will 
choose their representatives according to the latter’s ability to promote the 
public good—that is, according to their civic virtue—rather than on the basis 
of their affiliation with some factionist interests.184  At the same time, the 
periodic nature of elections ensures that representatives remain accountable 
 
 179 See, e.g., Henry J. Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, 1 HARV. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 77, 99–
100 (1988) (distinguishing between “thin” conceptions of political participation, which view 
elections as a “near-sufficient form of political participation,” and “strong” conceptions of political 
participation, which argue for an ongoing right to take part in the conduct of public affairs in 
various non-electoral ways that supplement voting).  
 180 See U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI (prohibiting abridgment of the right to vote on 
account of race, sex, or age or due to a failure to pay a poll tax).  
 181 See infra notes 188–95 and accompanying text.   
 182 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 35, at 31 (noting that the Framers adhered to a republican conception 
according to which politics consists of self-rule by citizens willing to subordinate their factional 
interests to the general good). 
 183 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 241 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  The Federalist No. 
39 is cited in Sunstein, supra note 33, at 1548 n.41.  
 184 Madison’s idea is that in large constituencies each representative is chosen by a large number of 
citizens with diverse interests, and therefore there are fewer chances that “unworthy candidates” 
will be able to offer their supporters selective benefits.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 183, 
at 82 (James Madison). 
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to their constituencies, who will be able to replace them in case they turn 
against the public interest.185  
In the Framers’ vision, once they are elected, the representatives should 
make decisions through a deliberative process that helps them discern the 
common good of the society and find the best ways to pursue it.  This 
deliberative process takes place within the representative body, without 
involving the public.  According to the Framers, such internal deliberation 
may yield decisions that are “more consonant to the public good than if 
pronounced by the people themselves,” for the wisdom of the representatives 
“may best discern the true interest of their country,” and their “patriotism 
and love of justice” will make them “least likely to sacrifice it to temporary 
or partial considerations.”186 
The constitutional framework envisioned by the Framers thus appears to 
have an elitist bent.  It assigns the task of governing to the most virtuous 
persons, whereas the role of citizens is largely confined to identifying these 
persons and choosing them as their representatives.187  Some scholars 
suggest, however, that a careful examination of the Framers’ work and of the 
historical context in which they operated reveals that their conception of civic 
participation was broader than it initially seems.  These scholars observe that 
the Framers were heavily influenced by republican ideals, which assign 
citizens a greater role in politics than mere participation in elections.188  
Classic republicanism views dialogue and discussion among the citizenry as 
crucial for discerning the common good as well as for inculcating civic virtue 
 
 185 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 183, at 241 (James Madison) (noting that elected 
representatives should be “holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good 
behavior”).  In addition to general periodic elections, the Framers made sure to include in the 
Constitution other mechanisms that would constrain the power of the government, such as the 
separation of powers and the protection of individual liberties.   
 186 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 183, at 82 (James Madison).  Madison further observes that: 
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who 
possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the 
society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them 
virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.   
  THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 183, at 350 (James Madison). Both sources are cited in 
Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 35, at 41.   
 187 See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term—Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 20 (1986) (explaining that the assertion that “there is a natural aristocracy of talent, for 
whom the tasks of government should, in everyone’s interest, be reserved,” may be seen as elitist).  
 188 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1013 
(1984); Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1493–94 (1988); Michelman, supra 
note 187, at 18–19; Sunstein, supra note 33, at 1539; Sunstein, supra note 35, at 31–32.  One of the 
purposes of the “Republican Revival” in constitutional legal scholarship was to refute the 
assumption that the Constitution’s Framers were exclusively influenced by classic liberalism or 
pluralism.  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 1695, 1695–96 (1989).  
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and enhancing individual self-realization.189  It therefore asserts that 
“political participation should be active and frequent and not limited to 
voting.”190  As Cass Sunstein explains, these republican principles were not 
fully or coherently endorsed by the Founding Fathers.191  However, they did 
play an important role in the constitutional framing process,192 and they 
should and do continue to inspire contemporary constitutional doctrine and 
interpretation.193  
Most notably, the republican ideal of participatory politics finds 
expression in the First Amendment, which enshrines, inter alia, the freedom 
of speech and the press, the right to peaceably assemble, and the right to 
petition the government.194  By protecting these freedoms from abridgement 
by the federal and state governments,195 this Amendment arguably 
establishes the basic conditions for authentic public deliberation, which 
cannot take place unless people are free to express their views.196  According 
to this reading, the main purpose of the Framers in adopting this amendment 
was to facilitate informal public deliberation that takes place in the streets, in 
town squares, in the press, and through lobbies and petitions, and which 
complements the internal deliberations that take place within official 
 
 189 See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V. 
TUSHNET & PAMELA S. KARLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7, 23 (8th ed. 2017).  
 190 Id. at 7.  
 191 See Sunstein, supra note 33, at 1558–60. 
 192 Sunstein explains that republican ideas were more strongly advocated by the Anti-federalists than 
by the Federalists.  However, important elements of republican thought can also be found in the 
views of the Federalists.  See id. at 1547. 
 193 See id. at 1540 (noting that “[r]epublican thought played a central role in the framing period, and it 
offers a powerful conception of politics and of the functions of constitutionalism,” and that “[t]he 
characteristically republican belief in deliberative democracy continues to influence . . . legal 
doctrine”).  According to Sunstein, the republican ideal of deliberative democracy finds its 
expression in the American constitutional framework, inter alia, in the adoption of a federal system 
that provides opportunities for local self-determination at the state level, as well as in the right to a 
jury trial, which is valued in the republican tradition as a “means of inculcating civic virtue and 
promoting participation.”  Id. at 1562 & n.128; see also Michelman, supra note 187, at 23 (noting 
that “the republican tradition of civic dialogue retains a strong, if somewhat disguised and twisted, 
hold on American constitutional imagination”). 
 194 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 33, at 1550 (asserting that “[t]he requirement of deliberation embodies 
substantive limitations” such as the protection of the freedom of speech); Cass R. Sunstein, The First 
Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1762 (1994) (“The Madisonian model sees the right of 
free expression as a key part of the system of public deliberation.”). 
 195 The text of the First Amendment only refers to the federal government.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
However, this amendment has been applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause.  See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1941); Schneider v. State, 
308 U. S. 147, 160 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938); De Jonge v. Oregon, 
299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936); Near v. Minnesota, 
283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 196 See Sunstein, supra note 33, at 1551.  
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government institutions.197  
The first to offer a comprehensive account of the deliberative foundations 
of the First Amendment was Alexander Meiklejohn.198  Considering the First 
Amendment within the historical context of its adoption and taking into 
account “the intention and structure of the Constitution as a whole,” 
Meiklejohn asserts that the main purpose of this amendment is to preserve 
the self-governing powers of the people.199  According to this view, the First 
Amendment “protects the freedom of those activities of thought and 
communication by which we [the people] ‘govern.’  It is concerned, not with 
a private right, but with a public power, a governmental responsibility.”200  
As Meiklejohn explains, “[i]n the specific language of the Constitution, the 
governing activities of the people appear only in terms of casting a ballot”; 
however, “in the deeper meaning of the Constitution, voting is merely the 
external expression of a wide and diverse number of activities by means of 
which citizens attempt to meet the responsibilities . . . which [the] freedom 
to govern lays upon them.”201  According to Meiklejohn, these 
responsibilities include, first, understanding the challenges that face the 
nation; second, passing judgment upon the decisions that the government 
makes to address those challenges; and third, devising methods whereby such 
decisions can become wiser and more effective.202  
Meiklejohn’s assertion that the main purpose of the First Amendment is 
to secure public engagement in governance has been endorsed by the 
Supreme Court in several cases, most famously in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan.203  In this case, the Court reversed a decision to award damages to a 
public officer following the publication of a defamatory advertisement in the 
New York Times, which criticized his official conduct.204  The Court asserted 
 
 197 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 187, at 54 (suggesting that the First Amendment can be understood 
to envision “actual” political participation, whose “main arena is not the formal legislative assembly, 
but rather a dispersed and continuous process of political discussion among coconstituents, and 
between them and their representatives”); see also id. at 57.  
 198 See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH: AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948) (arguing that there are two different types of freedom of speech); Alexander 
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245 (arguing that the First 
Amendment is not absolute).   
 199 See Meiklejohn, supra note 198, at 253–254.   
 200 Id. at 255.  This reading of the First Amendment may be contrasted with readings that emphasize its 
contribution to individual liberty and autonomy.   See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, The Process of Change and 
the Liberty Theory of the First Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 294 (1981) (putting forth the “unity 
thesis,” which suggests that “means and ends are necessarily united in the process of change”). 
 201 See Meiklejohn, supra note 198, at 255.  
 202 Id. 
 203 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  For a comprehensive discussion of the relationship between Meiklejohn’s 
thesis and the New York Times case, see William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn 
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965). 
 204 N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 256, 292. 
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that in view of the political nature of the defamatory publication, the freedom 
of speech and the press must be granted particularly strong protection.205  In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court invoked Madison’s statement that “the 
Constitution created a form of government under which ‘[t]he people . . . 
possess the absolute sovereignty,’”206 and that in such a system “the censorial 
power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government 
over the people.”207  These statements, according to the Court, revealed that 
the “central meaning of the First Amendment”208 was to provide “ample 
opportunity for the people to determine and resolve public issues.”209  In 
subsequent First Amendment cases, the Court reaffirmed the New York Times 
principle that public speech (as opposed to private or commercial speech) 
deserves particularly robust—in fact, almost absolute—protection, because 
such speech “is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government.”210 
Taking the proposition that the main purpose of the First Amendment is 
to enable authentic public deliberation and thereby promote meaningful 
political participation a step further, it could be argued that this Amendment 
entails not only that the government should refrain from imposing any 
constraints upon political speech, but also that, in some cases, it should take 
active measures to ensure that free political speech actually takes place.  The 
idea that a “Madisonian” reading of the First Amendment may call for its 
interpretation as incorporating both negative and positive elements is not 
new.  About fifty years ago, in the heyday of “traditional” mass media, 
Jerome Barron famously argued that the First Amendment places upon the 
government a duty to ensure that private broadcasting and newspaper 
companies offer a stage for a variety of competing views and ideas.211  In 
recent years it has been suggested that similar requirements should be 
applied to the new media giants, subjecting them to neutrality principles and 
limiting their ability to exclusively control any particular segment of internet 
 
 205 Id. at 270–71. The Court endorses here the concurring opinion of Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
 206 N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 274. 
 207 Id. at 275. 
 208 Id. at 273. 
 209 Id. at 302 (citing WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 41 (1958)).  
 210 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964).  
 211 See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967).  
The Supreme Court adopted a similar approach in the Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal 
Communications Commission when it upheld the right of the government to regulate broadcasting rights 
such that license holders would have to devote some airtime to presenting controversial issues of 
public importance from a variety of perspectives.  See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc’ns 
Comm’n, 395 U.S. 367, 400–01 (1969).  However, the Court stopped short of asserting that the 
government had a duty to apply such regulations.  See id. 
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infrastructure or services.212  
So far, the idea that the First Amendment may place a positive obligation 
upon the government to facilitate political speech has only been examined in 
the context of the government’s alleged responsibility to regulate the activity 
of media companies.  However, there seems to be no reason why some 
positive obligations concerning the freedom of speech should not apply 
directly to the government.  According to this view, in order to realize the 
deliberative goals of the First Amendment, federal and state agencies should 
be required to offer adequate opportunities to affected citizens to express 
their opinions with respect to certain policy issues.     
Of course, such requirements already apply to government agencies in 
some cases, most notably when they consider adopting new rules or repealing 
existing ones.  In these situations, the Administrative Procedure Act requires 
federal agencies to publish a notice of the proposed rule and to give interested 
persons an opportunity to submit written comments.213  Similar requirements 
can be found in many state laws.  However, according to the common 
understanding, these notice and comment requirements are not mandated 
by the Constitution, and there is no constitutional obligation upon federal or 
state agencies to pursue similar procedures when they make decisions that do 
not involve rulemaking.   
By contrast, if the First Amendment is understood to place positive 
obligations upon government agencies, then providing opportunities to the 
public to participate in policymaking processes in a meaningful, deliberative 
way may be a matter of constitutional duty.  A full examination of the 
possible implications of such a duty for different types of policymaking by 
different agencies, and of the specific requirements that it might entail in the 
age of digital data, is beyond the scope of this Article.  In the context of the 
present study, suffice it to say that this interpretation of the First Amendment 
seems to present two options for an agency that uses big data analysis to guide 
its decisions on controversial matters of significant public interest.  
The first option is to attempt to employ big data analysis in a manner that 
creates opportunities for the public to express diverse opinions and engage 
in meaningful discussion concerning the relevant policy issues.  The 
employment of big data analysis in such a deliberative manner depends, 
among other things, on the availability of advanced machine learning 
algorithms that can process complex natural language texts.  Such algorithms 
 
 212 See, e.g., Hannibal Travis, Of Blogs, eBooks, and Broadband: Access to Digital Media as a First Amendment 
Right, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1519, 1581 (2007) (arguing that antitrust and intellectual property law 
should be applied to the new media in a manner that promotes free speech); Neil Weinstock 
Netanel, New Media in Old Bottles?  Barron’s Contextual First Amendment and Copyright in the Digital Age, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 952, 953 (2008).  
 213 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012).  
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may allow for the automatic analysis of people’s comments on public 
affairs.214 Arguably, a governmental commitment to facilitating broad yet 
deliberative public involvement in policymaking—especially if backed by a 
legal obligation—can enhance the development of such technological 
capacities.215  This does not mean that once such technologies are developed, 
government agencies should only use big data analysis in a deliberative 
manner.  They may well rely on technical data that people produce passively 
or automatically to inform their policies.  However, they may not rely 
exclusively on such technical data. 
The second option is to complement big data analysis by other methods 
of public participation that allow for meaningful deliberation, such as face-to-
face or online consultations with those who have a special interest in the policy 
issues at stake.  Such parallel employment of quantitative and qualitative 
participation methods can satisfy free speech requirements until such time as 
big data analysis technologies allow for a better combination of the two. 
B.  Exclusion of Disadvantaged Groups and the Fourteenth Amendment 
Reading the First Amendment as imposing positive duties upon the 
government may also bear implications for the problem of exclusion from 
big data.  This reading suggests that, to the extent that the government uses 
big data as a platform for public deliberation, it must ensure that all those 
affected have access to this platform.  However, as implied above, even if at 
some point government agencies begin to use big data in a deliberative 
manner, relying on advanced machine learning technologies, they will 
probably do so only with respect to contested policy issues that involve 
considerable human discretion.  In other cases, they are likely to use big data 
in a technical, non-deliberative manner, taking advantage of the massive 
amount of digital data that is already out there.  The contribution of technical 
data to governmental analysis is thus likely to be a major way of influencing 
public policy, which should be open to everyone.  The First Amendment, of 
 
 214 See, e.g., WP BrandStudio, Future-proof: How Today’s Artificial Intelligence Solutions are Taking Government 
Services to the Next Frontier, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/ 
brand-connect/wp/2017/08/22/accenture/future-proof/?noredirect=on (cited in Benvenisti, 
supra note 14, at 62 n.295).  
 215 For example, the Department of Health and Human Services has recently tested a machine 
learning tool that can automatically process public comments on proposed regulations.  The 
purpose of the project was to increase the efficiency of informal rulemaking procedures mandated 
by the Administrative Procedure Act.  See supra note 213 and accompanying text; see also Office of 
the Chief Tech. Officer, Increasing Efficiency in Rule Making with Natural Language Processing, U.S. DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/cto/projects/increasing-efficiency-in-rule-
making-with-natural-language-processing/index.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) (stating that HHS 
Idea Labs project aimed to increase the efficiency of processing public comments) (cited in 
Benvenisti, supra note 14, at 62 n.296). 
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course, cannot be invoked to establish a right to participate in non-
deliberative big data analysis, for the provision of blood test results or cycling 
data to the government has nothing to do with free speech.  Instead, the most 
relevant source for asserting a right to be included in governmental big data 
analysis seems to be the Equal Protection Clause, which applies to state 
governments by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, and to the federal 
government by virtue of the Fifth Amendment.216  
According to its prevailing interpretation, the Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits governmental authorities from purposefully treating similarly 
situated persons differently.217  A court is most likely to find that this 
prohibition has been violated when it employs a strict or heightened level of 
scrutiny, which is the case when the group allegedly discriminated against is 
considered a protected class.218  Of course, the decision of the court as to 
whether a violation has occurred depends on various factors, including the 
existence of a public interest that could justify disparate treatment.219  
However, even without delving into these factors, it seems safe to assume that 
under the prevailing interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, exclusion 
from big data is unlikely to be deemed unconstitutional, for two main reasons.  
First, antidiscrimination jurisprudence has been reluctant to recognize 
socioeconomically disadvantaged people as members of a protected or quasi-
protected class.220  Although socioeconomic marginalization in general, and 
 
 216 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  This Equal 
Protection Clause only applies to state and local governments.  However, the United States Supreme 
Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the 
federal government through the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  U.S. CONST. amend. V; 
see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954) (holding that discrimination by the federal 
government may be violative of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). 
 217 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–42 (1976) (holding that in order to establish a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause, a claimant must show that discrimination was intentional, and 
noting that a disparate outcome in itself does not automatically prove discrimination); see also Akins 
v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1945) (emphasizing that discrimination must be intentional).  
 218 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right 
nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational 
relation to some legitimate end.”).  There is, however, no clear definition of what constitutes a 
protected class.  See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in 
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1542 (2004) (“American 
antidiscrimination law has no determinate criteria for deciding what practices are group-based 
classifications, and while courts sometimes articulate such criteria, they often apply them 
inconsistently . . . .”); Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 
138 (2011) (“The Supreme Court has not provided a coherent explanation for precisely what factors 
trigger heightened scrutiny.”). 
 219 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439–40 (1985). 
 220 See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (noting that the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held that poverty is not a suspect classification); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) (asserting 
that financial need alone does not identify a suspect class); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (explaining that people living in poor districts are not a protected 
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exclusion from big data in particular, often coincides with characteristics that 
otherwise establish protected classes, such as race, ethnicity, and gender,221 
these characteristics cannot be said to distinguish big data outsiders as a 
group.  Instead, big data outsiders represent a “large, diverse, and 
amorphous class” to which equal protection guarantees are rarely applied.222  
Second, in most cases, it would be hard to infer a discriminatory intent 
from the fact that socioeconomically disadvantaged people contribute to big 
data less than others.  As we have seen, governmental authorities often 
harvest big data from a wide range of sources over which they do not have 
full control.  It makes little sense to claim that the health authorities choose 
to collect medical data from EHRs or social sites because poor people do not 
have adequate access to these sources, or that urban planners collect data 
from mobile applications or from personal sensor kits precisely for this 
reason.  Even when the authorities are involved in the unequal distribution 
or installation of sensors or other devices from which they hope to collect big 
data, they do not necessarily do so with the intention to discriminate.  Indeed, 
the problem with big data-based policies is not that they intentionally ignore 
the needs of poorer or older populations, but rather that they fail to 
acknowledge the economic, socio-psychological, and cultural constraints that 
prevent these populations from producing big data in the same amount as 
better-off groups.  
It seems, then, that the existing equal protection doctrine, which requires 
an intentional disparate treatment of protected groups in order to establish 
unlawful discrimination, cannot pave the way for the inclusion of 
socioeconomically disadvantaged populations in big data.  As is well known, 
the disparate treatment doctrine has been criticized by many academics and 
civil rights advocates who have suggested that the Equal Protection Clause 
should be understood to prohibit not only intentional disparate treatment but 
 
class because they are “not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful 
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command 
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”); cf. Henry Rose, The Poor as a 
Suspect Class Under the Equal Protection Clause: An Open Constitutional Question, 34 NOVA L. REV. 407, 
417–18 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez 
has been misunderstood and that, in fact, the Court has not yet decided whether the poor are a 
quasi-suspect or suspect class).  The term “quasi-protected class” refers to “a class of individuals 
who lack political power and have been subjected to purposeful, intentional discrimination to a 
lesser degree than individuals in a fully suspect class.”  See Jennifer E. Watson, When No Place Is 
Home: Why the Homeless Deserve Suspect Classification, 88 IOWA L. REV. 501, 508 (2003).  
 221 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.  
 222 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 28; see also Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National 
Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 334 (2006) (noting that “equal protection has been less potent in 
addressing disadvantage . . . that affects a diffuse or amorphous class”); Lerman, supra note 57, at 
60 (citing Liu, supra, at 334). 
 
Feb. 2019] BIG DATA AND THE RIGHT TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 755 
also unintentional disparate impact.223  According to this approach, 
governmental practices that are neutral on their face but have a 
disproportionately adverse impact on protected classes should also be 
considered unconstitutional.224  Unlike the disparate treatment standard, 
which focuses on the formal classifications underlying particular 
governmental decisions, disparate impact is concerned with the actual effects 
of the ongoing subordination of historically disempowered groups.225  Had 
this standard been adopted by the Supreme Court, big data-based 
governmental policies that disfavor socioeconomically disadvantaged 
populations might have been deemed unconstitutional.226  For although big 
data is perfectly neutral on its face and seems to provide an Arendtian mask 
that denies discriminatory classifications,227 it can actually perpetuate the 
underrepresentation and political subordination of historically 
disadvantaged groups.  
Another somewhat speculative constitutional solution to the problem of 
big data exclusion may be found in the Privileges or Immunities Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which precedes the Equal Protection Clause.228  
This Clause, which provides that states shall not abridge the privileges or 
immunities of the citizens of the United States, grants some entitlements to 
all citizens of the United States and asserts that states must respect these 
entitlements.229  However, the content and scope of these entitlements are 
not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution and have been the subject of 
 
 223 See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of 
Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV.  953, 968 (1993) (contending that “the Davis rule reflects a 
distinctively white way of thinking about race”); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial 
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. 
REV. 1049, 1052, 1054–57 (1978) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s focus on discriminatory intent); 
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 
STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987) (asserting that “requiring proof of conscious or intentional 
motivation as a prerequisite to constitutional recognition that a decision is race-dependent ignores 
much of what we understand about how the human mind works”); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection 
No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1131 (1997) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s current interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause authorizes 
state action that perpetuates historic forms of race and gender stratification). 
 224 See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 701, 708 (2006) 
(observing that disparate impact theorists are concerned with the perpetuation of past lawful 
discrimination through what appear to be neutral practices).  
 225 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976) 
(arguing that the approach that focuses on formal classifications is highly individualistic and does 
not take social reality fully into account).  
 226 See Lerman, supra note 57, at 57, 61–62 (arguing that a new big data antisubordination doctrine 
may be needed to protect the persons whom the big data revolution risks sidelining).  
 227 See supra notes 106–11, 115–16, and accompanying text.  
 228 “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 229 Id. 
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much controversy.230  In the 1872 Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court 
interpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause very narrowly, rejecting the 
view that it protects all the basic rights of U.S. citizens against infringement 
by the states, and instead holding that it secures only a limited number of 
rights that “owe their existence to the Federal government,” such as the right 
to interstate travel and the right to use the nation’s navigable waters.231  
According to the Court’s reading, the Clause preserves rather than limits 
state authority over civil rights, subjecting it only to “an anemic and eclectic 
array”232 of external rights that stem directly from federal citizenship.  
Following the Slaughter-House decision, which was reiterated by the Supreme 
Court in subsequent cases,233 the Privileges or Immunities Clause has lain 
nearly dormant for 145 years,234 
However, although Slaughter-House remains on the books, many legal 
scholars maintain, along with the minority judges in Slaughter-House, that this 
decision represents a flawed interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause.235  According to these critics, the Clause was meant to protect against 
state abridgement of a broader list of substantive rights than Slaughter-House 
 
 230 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 98 
(1980) (noting that the Privileges or Immunities Clause “is quite inscrutable, indicating only that 
there should exist some set of constitutional entitlements not explicitly enumerated in the 
document”); Emily Jennings, Let’s All Agree to Disagree, and Move On: Analyzing Slaughter-House and 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause Under “Sunk Cost” Principles, 54 B.C. L. REV. 
1803, 1806–15 (2013) (detailing the disagreements among legal historians with respect to the 
intention of the drafters of the Privileges or Immunities Clause). 
 231 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74–75, 78–80 (1873).  
 232 Goodwin Liu, supra note 222, at 354.  
 233 In the few cases since Slaughter-House where petitioners attempted to expand the scope of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Supreme Court refused to revive it.  See, e.g., McDonald v. City 
of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3030–31 (2010) (refusing to assert that the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
required states to respect the right to bear arms, and preferring to apply this duty to states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551–
53 (1875) (holding that the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not protect the right to peaceably 
assemble to petition state policies).  
 234 As Alexander M. Bickel has observed, the Slaughter-House decision “just about read the privileges 
and immunities clause out of the Constitution.”  See Alexander M. Bickel, Citizenship in the American 
Constitution, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 378 (1973).  
 235 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 83, 96–101 (Field, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the 
majority’s interpretation of the Clause made it a “vain and idle enactment, which accomplished 
nothing,” and suggesting instead that it was meant to expand the protections provided by the 
Comity Clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution); id. at 111, 118–119 (Bradley, J., 
dissenting) (opining that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended to secure the federal 
rights enumerated in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights against state infringement).  See generally 
Richard L. Aynes, Ink Blot or Not: The Meaning of Privileges and/or Immunities, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
1295 (2009) (arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporates the Bill of Rights); Akhil 
Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992) (same); 
Kimberly C. Shankman & Roger Pilon, Reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause to Redress the Balance 
Among States, Individuals, and the Federal Government, 3 TEX. REV. L & POL. 1 (1998) (same). 
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recognized.236  More specifically, some critics suggest that, read together with 
the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,237 the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause should be understood to guarantee the equal right of all 
citizens of the United States to enjoy the benefits of national citizenship 
regardless of their state of residence.238  According to Goodwin Liu, this 
guarantee of equal national citizenship places a duty upon both state 
governments and the federal government to secure for all citizens “full 
membership [and] effective participation . . . in the national community.”239  
Liu and other legal historians find evidence in the debates that surrounded 
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and in contemporaneous legal 
doctrine and commentary that the Citizenship Clause and the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause were intended to “encompass[ ] substantive rights 
necessary to make citizenship meaningful and effective.”240  The Framers 
understood, however, that “citizenship was an evolving concept” and 
therefore chose to employ the “broad language of ‘Privileges or Immunities’” 
that would “enable future generations . . . to develop further the privileges 
and immunities of citizenship.”241 
If we accept the propositions that the Privileges or Immunities Clause is 
intended to secure equal citizenship and effective participation in political life 
and that the exact meaning of these guarantees should be determined in 
accordance with the realities of a given period, we can argue that in the 
second decade of the twenty-first century, this Clause protects the right of all 
citizens to equal representation in big data that shapes public policy.242  We 
can also argue that this right is enforceable against both state (and local) 
governments and the federal government, and that it places upon them an 
 
 236 See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, Belonging, Protection and Equality: The Neglected Citizenship Clause and the 
Limits of Federalism, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 313–14 (2000) (asserting that there is considerable 
evidence that the Framers intended the Privileges or Immunities to apply very broadly and to 
“encompass all fundamental human rights and link those rights to national citizenship”). 
 237 “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 238 See, e.g., Liu, supra note 222, at 354; Zietlow, supra note 236, at 307–33. 
 239 Liu, supra note 222, at 335 
 240 Id. at 357; see also Rebecca E. Zietlow, Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights and John Bingham’s Theory 
of Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. REV. 717, 739 (2003) (“Evidence from the Ratification debates and 
contemporaneous legal doctrine indicates that the framers viewed the meaning of federal 
citizenship very broadly and that the rights that adhered to citizenship were considerably broader 
than those enumerated in the Bill of Rights.”).  
 241 James W. Fox Jr., Citizenship, Poverty, and Federalism: 1787–1882, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 421, 504 (1999); 
see Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench, The Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 CONST. 
COMMENT. 235, 274–75 (1994) (“[T]he framers realized . . . that the amendment’s precise content 
in some sense was in the hands of future generations.”); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary 
Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 923–26 (1986). 
 242 Goodwin Liu reaches a similar conclusion with respect to equal opportunities in education, arguing 
that the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes and obligates Congress to ensure a meaningful floor of 
educational opportunity throughout the nation.  See Liu, supra note 222, at 335. 
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affirmative duty to promote big data equality.243  Given the fact that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause has drawn far less judicial attention than the 
Equal Protection Clause, it may be easier for courts and governmental 
authorities to adopt a broad interpretation of the former that encompasses 
big data equality than to admit the illegality of big data’s disparate impact 
under the latter.  
Assuming that the Fourteenth Amendment—by virtue of either the 
Equal Protection Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause—requires 
that big data-based policymaking be inclusive of all segments of the 
population, what should state and federal authorities do to meet this 
requirement?  At the least, it seems, they need to address the two basic 
dimensions of the digital divide, namely, physical access and mental skills.244  
This means, first, that government authorities should make every effort to 
ensure that the digital sources from which they collect big data are accessible 
to everyone.  For example, a local authority that relies on data produced by 
personal smart-city sensor kits to address noise and air pollution could offer 
such sensors for free to those who cannot afford to purchase them.  Or, if the 
authority collects data from stationary sensors that it installs in public places, 
it should make sure that the sensors are distributed evenly across town.  
Similarly, if health authorities wish to harvest medical data from personal 
health monitors, they should make sure that the cost of the latter does not 
prevent potential participants from using them.  Of course, in some cases it 
may be more complicated to expand access to digital sources.  For example, 
to ensure equal representation in EHRs may take a fundamental reform in 
federal health insurance coverage, which does not seem feasible at this 
time.245  It may be possible, however, to find alternative ways to collect data 
relating to the medical needs of uninsured persons and to take it into account 
when shaping health policies.  Second, government authorities should 
develop and implement programs to facilitate diverse uses of digital platforms 
by all citizens.  These programs should help people acquire the technical 
skills that allow them to produce digital data, and they should also raise 
awareness of the potential policy implications of producing such data, so as 
 
 243 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, 
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.  Many 
commentators assert that the enforcement power granted to the Congress in Section 5 also places 
upon it an obligation to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, including the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause.  See, e.g., Farber & Muench, supra note 241, at 236 (“The fourteenth amendment was 
intended to bridge the gap between positive law and higher law by empowering the national 
government to protect the natural rights of its citizens.”); Liu, supra note 222, at 335; William J. 
Rich, Taking “Privileges or Immunities” Seriously: A Call to Expand the Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN. L. 
REV. 153, 159 (2002) (arguing that Congress should enforce the privileges or immunities of 
citizenship); Zietlow, supra note 236, at 310 (“[T]he Citizenship Clause also invokes the power of 
the federal government to protect the rights that adhere to federal citizenship.”).  
 244 See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text.  
 245 See supra notes 140–44 and accompanying text. 
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to allow people to make informed choices about their digital activities.  In 
addition to taking active measures to promote inclusiveness, government 
authorities should make sure to abide by transparency principles that allow 
those affected by big data-based policymaking to know, to the extent possible, 
which data was used, how it was collected, and from whom.  
As noted above, much of the digital data that government authorities 
employ to inform policymaking is originally collected by private entities (e.g., 
medical clinics, health insurers, internet giants, and mobile software 
developers) for their own non-policy-oriented purposes.  Hence, in order to 
ensure that the data that they analyze is inclusive, government authorities 
may have to place some inclusiveness requirements upon those private data 
providers.  These entities can be required to facilitate access to certain 
services that they provide, which are of potential use to policymakers.  They 
can also be required to actively encourage disengaged populations to use 
digital technology in a manner that has the potential to affect public policy, 
for example by soliciting their inputs on public affairs or by nudging them to 
produce other policy-relevant information.  Finally, private data collectors 
should also be subjected to transparency requirements that enable public 
scrutiny of non-policy-oriented data used by the government.  These 
requirements may be softer than the ones that apply directly to the 
government and may be subject to trade secret protection and other 
exceptions.  While all these regulatory measures, even if moderate, are likely 
to meet with some resistance on the part of powerful private data collectors, 
the experience of recent years shows that governmental attempts to regulate 
the big data industry can nonetheless be effective.  So far, such regulation has 
mostly been designed to protect customer privacy and security,246 but there 
seems to be no reason why regulatory efforts to promote the vital interest of 
(and, arguably, the constitutional right to) data inclusiveness should not be 
equally successful.  
 
 
 246 See, e.g., Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012) (allowing 
consumers to access their credit reports and prescribing measures to reduce the risk of identity 
theft); Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), 44 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3559 
(2012) (creating a security framework for federal information systems); Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012) (regulating the online collection of personal 
information from children under the age of thirteen); Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2012) (requiring healthcare entities to 
secure the confidentiality of personal health information); Protecting the Privacy of Customers of 
Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services, Report and Order (Broadband Privacy 
Order), 81 Fed. Reg. 87,274, 87,275 (Dec. 2, 2016) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64) (empowering 
broadband consumers to decide how data is used and shared by broadband providers).   
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CONCLUSION 
The incorporation of big data analysis into public policymaking carries a 
promise not only of enhanced accuracy and efficiency, but also of greater 
political participation.  In an ideal world, big data could allow all affected 
citizens to have their voice heard in policymaking processes.  In the real 
world, however, big data fails to fulfill this potential.  First, instead of 
providing a platform through which people can convey their reasoned 
opinions about contested policy questions, big data serves merely as a means 
for the government to aggregate and analyze technical data about people’s 
habits and conditions.  Second, instead of functioning as a mask that covers 
physical characteristics such as gender and race and thus allows people to 
participate in collective decision-making on an equal basis, the apparent 
neutrality of big data allows for the exclusion of disadvantaged populations 
to go unnoticed, thereby reinforcing political inequalities.  
Constitutional law can offer a normative framework for addressing these 
deficits and reducing the gap between the promise and reality of big data-
based policymaking.  This Article has presented a somewhat uncommon yet 
plausible interpretation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments that may 
establish a constitutional right to meaningful and inclusive participation in 
governmental big data analysis.  This interpretation takes into account the 
original intention of the Constitution’s Framers and the values that they 
sought to promote, but at the same time it acknowledges the need to adapt 
these values to contemporary political and technological circumstances.  
Although this interpretation does not find full support in existing judicial 
decisions, it may be adopted in the future when courts will have to face the 
challenges that rapidly emerging big data applications pose to legal doctrine 
created in the pre-big data era.  If this happens, government authorities will 
have to find ways to make big data-based policymaking more deliberative 
and inclusive.  The Article has proposed possible directions towards 
accomplishing this task, which need to be further examined and refined 
against real-life technological and political developments.       
